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COMMENT
SHIPOWNER'S DUTIES AND APPORTIONM1ENT OF




In 1972, Congress undertook a major revision of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).' The LHWCA provides
longshoremen and other harbor workers2 with no-fault benefits for job-related
injuries and insulates compensation-paying employers from any other liability
based on those injuries. 3 The 1972 amendments were enacted to eliminate the
"circular liability suit," a mechanism developed in a series of Supreme Court
decisions 4 that enabled injured waterfront workers to obtain full damages
from their employers who were supposedly immune from suit under the
LHWCA.5
The circular liability suit was made possible by the unique organization of
the longshoring industry. Typically, harbor workers are hired by independent
contractors, known as stevedores, who in turn contract with shipowners to
provide longshoring services. 6 The stevedore is the employer under the
1. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970)). For a general discussion of the
scope of the 1972 revisions, see Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. Mar. L. & Corn. 1 (1974); Robertson, Jurisdiction,
Shipowner Negligence and Stevedore Immunities Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshore-
men's Act, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 515 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson 1]; Robertson, Negligence
Actions by Longshoremen Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. Mar. L. & Corn. 447 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson IHl;
Theis, Amended Section Five of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41
Tenn. L. Rev. 773 (1974); Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
& Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 41 Ins. Counsel J. 63 (1974).
2. The LHWCA applies not only to longshoremen but also to any person engaged in maritime
employment including shiprepairmen, shipbuilders, and shipbreakers, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976),
who is injured in navigable waters or adjoining areas. Id. § 903(a). The statute expressly excludes
masters and crew members. Id. The LHWCA includes owners, charterers, agents, masters,
officers, and crew members in the definition of "vessel." Id. § 902(2 1). The term "longshoreman"
as used in this Comment will include any harbor worker covered by the LHWCA unless
otherwise indicated. The term "stevedore" will be used to refer to independent contractors who
employ harbor workers. The term "shipowner" will include officers and crew members employed
by the shipowner.
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(a) (1976). The exclusive liability section, unchanged by the 1972
amendments, provides: "The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death." Id. § 905(a). Insurance
carriers share the employer's immunity from suit under the LHAVCA. Johnson v. American Mut.
Liability Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 382, 388-90 (5th Cir. 1977).
4. See notes 10-11 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 10-12 infra and accompanying text.
6. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §§ 6-4, -46, at 278, 410 (2d ed. 1975).
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LHWCA, liable to the longshoreman for compensation benefits and receiving
immunity from law suits. 7 Shipowners receive no such protection and the
statute specifically authorizes longshoremen to sue them as third parties.8
There is a great potential for such suits because the work location belongs to
the shipowner. In addition, shipowners own most of the equipment used by
the longshoremen. 9 As a result of this unusual employment situation, injuries
to workers covered by the LHWCA almost always involve three parties: the
injured longshoreman, the stevedore-employer, and the third party ship-
owner.
The circular liability suit actually consisted of two separate actions. First,
shipowners were held liable to longshoremen for most shipboard injuries
based upon a warranty of seaworthiness, a form of strict liability.10 Second,
7. Id.
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b), 933(a) (1976).
9. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 6, §§ 6-4, -46, at 278, 410; Theis, supra note 1, at 773.
For this reason industry representatives urged Congress to enact a bill making shipowners and
stevedores joint employers of longshoremen and therefore immune from suit. Hearings on H.R.
247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006, H.R. 15023, Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. On
Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 91-94 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The
proposal, however, was rejected.
The potential for third-party suits is further increased by the fact that longshoring is one of the
most dangerous occupations in the United States. At the time of the amendments, the injury
frequency rate was four times that of manufacturing. S. Rep. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The House and Senate reports are substantially the
same. See H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [19721 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad News 4698. Amendment of the LHWCA appears to have had little effect on reducing
injuries in the longshoring and shipbuilding industries. Total workdays lost as a result of
occupational injuries for longshoremen and other harbor workers have increased from 396.3 per
100 workers in 1973 to 520.8 in 1975. Among shipbuilding and shiprepair employees, lost
workdays have increased from 152.6 to 215.6. In contrast, the rates for total private sector
employees were only 53.3 in 1973 and 56.1 in 1975. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of
Labor, Bull. No. 1966, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Table 147, at 319-25 (1977). In 1974,
longshoring ranked first and shipbuilding and shiprepairing ranked tenth among all occupational
classifications in number of lost work days. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull,
No. 1932, Occupational Injuries and Illnesses in the United States by Industry, 1974, at 18
(1976). Statistics compiled by the National Safety Councl reflect similar rates. Figures for 1973
through 1975 indicate that the injury frequency rate for stevedoring was more than double that for
all industries combined. Also, the injury severity rate was over four times as high. National
Safety Council, Accident Facts 36-37 (1976).
10. Early cases involving maritime personal injuries were dominated by the Supreme Court's
desire to compensate workers for almost every work-related injury and to extend the liberal
remedies available to seamen to other harbor workers. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 6,
§ 6-46, at 411. Recovery for personal injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel became
available to seamen in 1903. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158. 175 (1903) (dictum). The warranty of
seaworthiness encompassed defects in the structure or equipment of the ship that rendered It
"inadequate for the purpose for which it was ordinarily used." Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,
321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944). Liability for defects was imposed without regard to negligence, and the
shipowner's duty could not be discharged by the exercise of due care. Id. at 105; Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922). The duty to provide a seaworthy ship and
equipment was absolute and nondelegable. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. at 102.
In 1946, the Supreme Court extended the seamen's action for unseaworthiness to longshore-
men, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), and the remedy was later extended to
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stevedores were required to indemnify shipowners for damages recovered by
longshoremen under a warranty of workmanlike performance, a doctrine that
held stevedores responsible for almost every unseaworthy condition that could
be connected to them or to their employees."' Through this process, workers
were able to circumvent the LHWCA and indirectly obtain full damages from
the stevedore for most shipboard injuries despite his immunity from suit.
other harbor workers exposed to dangers caused by unseaworthy conditions. Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412-13 (1953). The scope of the warranty was continually expanded until
1972. E.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (defective cargo containers,
dangerous conditions on the pier); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S 539 (1960)
(temporary or transitory conditions); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959) (defect-free equipment which was improperly adjusted); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v Pan-
Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (defective stowage of cargo); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (unfit crew members); Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478
(9th Cir. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (defective equipment brought on board by
the stevedore).
The Court rejected defenses raised by shipowners that they had neither actual nor constructive
knowledge of the defect, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. at 549, or that they had
relinquished control of the vessel in a seaworthy condition. E.g., Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co.,
205 F.2d at 480. Although the Supreme Court stated that shipowners were not required to
provide an accident-free ship, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. at 550, in reality
shipowners had become insurers of the safety of workers aboard their vessels.
11. Until 1956, shipowners were required to bear the entire burden of longshoremen's
recoveries based upon unseaworthiness. The Supreme Court had rejected any form of contribution
in third-party suits, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,
285-87 (1952), and refused to allow an offset or credit to shipowners equal to the amount of
compensation benefits paid by a negligent stevedore. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U S. 406,
411-12 (1953), discussed at notes 230-32 infra and accompanying text.
In 1956, however, the Court held that stevedores could be required to indemnify shipowners
based upon an implied "warranty of workmanlike service," an independent duty owed to sIipoM-
ers arising out of the agreement to provide longshoring services. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The stevedore's warranty was distinguished from
tort concepts of apportionment, which were prohibited by the exclusive liability provision of
the LHWCA. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1958);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. at 128-32. The exercise of due care did
not satisfy the warranty, Italia Societa per Azioni di Naviganzione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315, 320-22, 324 (1965), and with respect to equipment he supplied, the stevedore was
held to a standard approaching strict liability--the equipment must be safe and fit for intended
use. Id. at 322. In addition, negligence of the shipowner in causing the injury did not preclude a
successful indemnity action, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U-S at
567, and liability was imposed even when the shipowner created the unseaworthy condition and
it was merely aggravated by the stevedore's conduct. E.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
Prior to 1972, the stevedore's warranty was extended to the fitness of the longshoremen he
provided. Contributory negligence on the part of a longshoreman was held to be a breach of the
warranty rendering the stevedore liable to the shipowner for the damages recovered by the
longshoreman. E.g., McLaughlin v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B, 408 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir-). cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969). Not only were stevedores indirectly liable for damages paid by the
shipowner, but liability for unseaworthiness also was imposed on shipowners who hired
longshoremen directly. In this situation, the shipowner was required to make no-fault compensa-
tion benefits as an employer, but was denied the protection of the statute's exclusive liability
provision. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.. 386 U.S. 731 (1967); Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U S.
410 (1963).
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The circular liability suit frustrated Congress' intention in creating a
workmen's compensation statute for harbor workers. 12 It also encouraged
unneccessary litigation which resulted in burdensome and unpredictable
insurance costs for stevedores. 23 Congress attempted to resolve these problems
by amending the LHWCA in 1972. Under the amendments, the statutory
compensation benefits available to injured longshoremen were substantially
increased. 14 In addition, Congress added section 905(b) which limited the
shipowner's liability for work-related injuries by replacing the longshoremen's
strict liability action for unseaworthiness with one based upon negligence and
relieved stevedores of the burden of having to indemnify shipowners for
damages recovered by longshoremen in third-party suits.15
Although it is clear that section 905(b) has effectively dismantled the
12. Workmen's compensation statutes are often viewed as a compromise between employers
and employees. Workers give up their rights to sue in return for guaranteed benefits. Employers
agree to provide such benefits in return for immunity from suit. See Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514
F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1975); 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 1.10 (1978);
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 80, at 531-32 (4th ed. 1971). Although the LHWCA
granted such immunity to compensation-paying employers, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976), It effec-
tively had been repealed by the shipowner's right to indemnity. See note 11 supra and
accompanying text.
13. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 4, 9. According to testimony at the House hearings on the
1972 amendments, although benefits payable under the LHWCA had remained constant and the
number of injuries had actually decreased, the cost of workmen's compensation insurance
increased substantially, reflecting the large recoveries and legal costs resulting from the increased
number of third-party suits. Hearings, supra note 9, at 85; see Senate Report, supra note 9, at 9,
A witness from the insurance industry estimated that one out of every three dollars paid was
attributable to third-party suits. Hearings, supra note 9, at 242. Other testimony indicated that
legal fees accounted for approximately 50% of the expenditures connected with third-party suits,
id. at 106, and that employer's insurance costs had tripled between 1961 and 1972. Id. at 86.
14. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-576, § 5(b), 86 Stat. 1252 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1976)). The maximum weekly
benefit available under the LHWCA was increased from $70 to 200% of the national weekly wage
to be redetermined annually by the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 906(b)(l)(D).
15. The section provides that: "In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter
caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages by reasoil thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance
with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel
for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be
void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship
building or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the
negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair services to the vessel. The
liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness
or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall
be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel excepi remedies available under this chapter."
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
The 1972 amendments were held to be constitutional as a legitimate exercise of congressional
power to alter the substantive law of admiralty. Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237,
1244-46 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz
Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 387 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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circular liability suit, the section does not explain the duty 6 owed by
shipowners to longshoremen, and does not address the question of whether
the stevedore's fault should in any way short of indemnity or contribution
affect the shipowner's liability to the longshoreman. As a result, circuit
courts confronted with these questions have reached conflicting results. With
respect to the shipowner's duty, the Second and Fifth Circuits have applied
by analogy the rules defining a landowner's duty to business invitees,' 7 while
the Third and Ninth Circuits have applied the rules relating to employers of
independent contractors.' The Fourth Circuit has employed both ap-
proaches, 19 and there is considerable conflict within several of the other
circuits.2 0 With respect to the apportionment of damages question, the Fourth
Circuit has held that the shipowner is entitled to an offset or credit represent-
ing the portion of the damages attributable to a stevedore's negligence. 2' The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that, under the 1972 amend-
ments, shipowners must pay the full amount of the longshoremen's dam-
ages;22 it appears that the Second Circuit will follow suit.2 3
This Comment will analyze these problems and attempt to suggest solutions
that are consistent with congressional intent. Part I will examine the case law
defining the shipowner's duty created by the 1972 amendments. Part II will
criticize and attempt to reconcile some of the conflicting cases and propose a
uniform definition of duty. Finally, Part H will discuss the propriety of
apportioning damages when an injury is caused by the concurrent negligence
of the stevedore and the shipowner.
16. It is important to note the distinction between the concepts of duty and standard of care.
Duty generally refers to a legal obligation to conform to a particular standard of care arising out
of the relationship between the parties. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 4 (1965); W. Prose',
supra note 12, §§ 42, 52, at 244-45, 324-27. The applicable standard of care defines the conduct
required of one under a duty, id. § 52 at 324, which, under § 905(b), is to exercise reasonable care.
Both the existence of a duty and a failure to conform to the required standard of care are
necessary elements of a tort cause of action. W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 30, at 143. That § 905(b)
does not define the duty owed by shipowners but only the standard of care, and that courts
sometimes use the terms interchangeably, has led to some confusion in cases when liability is
sought to be imposed for a negligent failure to act. See Shepler v. Weyerhauser Co., 279 Or. 477,
490-91, 569 P.2d 1040, 1047-48 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
17. E.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); Napoli v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. E.g., Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Pan., 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977); Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
19. E.g., Chavis v. Finnines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978); Anuszewski v.
Dynamic Mariners Corp., Pan., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (per cuarm), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1098 (1977).
20. See notes 87, 97 infra and accompanying text.
21. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479).
22. E.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978);
Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976).
23. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978); Landon v. Lief Hoegh &
Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
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I. THE SHIPOWNER'S DUTY
A. The Theory of Negligence Applied by the Courts
As a result of Congress' failure to explain the shipowner's duty24 in the
legislative history, courts have had to look for guidance to existing areas of
law. Although one treatise2 5 has advocated application of the body of law
developed under the Jones Act, 26 courts have unanimously rejected this
proposal as inconsistent with congressional intent. 27 Two other possibilities
are the definition of duty developed in negligence actions brought by
longshoremen prior to 1972,28 and the formulation of duty developed in cases
dealing with landowners. 29
Maritime negligence law is generally viewed as placing a somewhat higher
duty on shipowners than that traditionally imposed upon landowners under
state law. 30 The common law distinctions based upon the plaintiff's relation-
ship to the shipowner (invitee/licensee) have been abolished 3' and, in addi-
24. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
25. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 6, § f-57, at 453-55.
26. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). Under the Jones Act, seamen may sue shipowners for negligence.
Id. The shipowner is held to a high standard of care and seamen benefit from favorable rules
concerning burden of proof. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958);
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957); G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra
note 6, §§ 6-35 to -37, at 376-78. See also Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367
(1932).
27. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 40 n.12, 45 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F.
Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. La. 1974); 1A E. Jhirad, Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 6-10 (7th ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Benedict]. Congress did not refer to the Jones Act in the legislative
history and expressly rejected the rationale of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946),
that longshoremen should be entitled to the same remedies as seamen. Senate Report, supra note
9, at 8-10.
28. Maritime negligence law received little attention from the courts after the decision in Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). As the warranty of seaworthiness came to
encompass negligent acts aboard ship in addition to defects in structure and equipment, the two
theories overlapped and recoveries were generally based upon unseaworthiness. See G. Gilmore &
C. Black, supra note 6, § 6-37, at 379. A negligence action, however, was the only remedy
available when the harbor worker was not performing traditional seamen's work, e.g., United
N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilot's Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U S. 613, 617-18 (1959), when the vessel
was not in navigation at the time of the injury, e.g., West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959),
and in death cases before the decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970) (allowing a wrongful death action based upon unseaworthiness under maritime law), e.g.,
Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) (state wrongful death statutes applied). One commen-
tator has advocated application of the maritime theory of negligence developed in these cases to
suits under § 905(b). See Comment, Negligence Standards Under the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the Viewpoints, 21 VIII. L.
Rev. 244, 267-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Viewpoints]. See also 1A Benedict, supra note 27, §
112, at 6-9 to -10.
29. See Vickery, supra note 1, at 64-66. See also Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and the Invitee Standard: Maritime Law Gone Aground?, 53 Wash.
L. Rev. 663 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Invitee Standard]; 6 J. Mar. L. & Coin. 643 (1975).
30. See Citizen v. M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198, 202 n.3 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Robertson II,
supra note 1, at 451-52.
31. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630, 632 (1959).
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tion, the shipowner's obligation to provide a safe place to work has been held
to be a nondelegable duty.3 2 In recent years, however, the landowner's
obligation has undergone like changes. 33 As a result, modern theories of
premises liability are quite similar to maritime negligence law.34 The real
issue, therefore, is not whether the section 905(b) duty should be based upon
landowner or maritime theories but how progressive the duty 9hould be.
The legislative history of section 905(b) does not give a clear indication of
which definition of duty was intended by Congress. On the one hand, the
Senate report expressly states that the more progressive admiralty rules
prohibiting the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are
to be retained and that the rule of comparative negligence is to be applied. 35
Statements in the report suggest a relatively high standard of care in provid-
ing longshoremen with a safe place to work and in taking corrective action
when the shipowner knows or should know about a dangerous condition. 36
On the other hand, the report states that a longshoreman's recovery may not
be based upon a nondelegable duty owed by the shipowner and that shipown-
ers are not to be charged with the negligent acts of stevedores or their
employees, 37 both of which imply that the more traditional aspects of land-
based law were considered relevant by Congress.
32. See, e.g., Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963). cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Vanderlinden
v. Lorentzen, 139 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1944); 1A Benedict, supra note 27, §§ 112, 114, at 6-4 to -9,
-12. See also Boleski v. American Export Lines, Inc., 385 F.2d 69, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1967); Price v.
SS Yaracuy, 378 F.2d 156, 161-62 (5th Cir. 1967); Ferrante v. Swedish Am. Lines. 331 F,2d 571,
575 (3d Cir.) (holding the shipowner liable when he knows or should know of dangerous
conditions arising during the work), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 801 (1964). Shipowners, however, are
often relieved of this duty once possession and control of the workplace are relinquished and the
danger is created by the work of independent contractors. E.g., West v. United States, 361 U.S.
118 (1959); Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 402 F2d 238 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969).
33. See notes 90, 117 infra and accompanying text.
34. See generally Teofilovich v. d'Amico MediterraneanfPacific Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 737
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
35. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 12.
36. Id. at 10-11. A factor suggesting that Congress did not intend strict adherence to
land-based law is the preservation of the right of a longshoreman hired directly by the shipowner
to sue his employer for negligence. See note 48 infra. Lawsuits against compensation-paying
employers generally are not permitted in land-based law. See 2A Larson, supra note 12, § 66.10,
at 12-20 to -21.
37. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10-11. The committee report states at numerous points
that shipowners are to be in the same position as third parties in nonmaritime employment
situations and that maritime workers are to have the same rights as their land-based counterparts
have against third parties. Id. at 9, 10-11. Congress' use of the term land-based standards,
however, is not very helpful because there is no uniform common law rule of landowners liability
and often no rules exist for the type of dangers encountered by longshoremen. See, e.g., Espinoza
v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Robertson I, supra note
1, at 466; Viewpoints, supra note 28, at 266-67. The legislative history does not refer to the law of
any particular jurisdiction, to any Restatement provisions, or to any recognized common law
doctrines such as the "open and obvious" rule or the rules relating to work done by independent
contractors. See, e.g., Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 454 (W.D.
Wash. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. AIS, 435 F. Supp. 484, 492-93 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
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Despite the apparent conflict in the legislative history, courts overwhelm-
ingly have chosen to impose upon shipowners the more traditional duty owed
by landowners to persons injured on their property. 38 Based upon segments of
the legislative history, courts have determined that these land-based standards
are consistent with congressional intent, whereas the maritime standard
incorporates theories of vicarious liability and nondelegable duties which were
expressly rejected by Congress.39
B. Application of Land-Based Standards
1. Landowner's Duties to Invitees-Sections 343
and 343A of the Restatement
a. Dangers Known to Both the Shipowner
and the Longshoremen
Initially, district courts applying land-based standards generally classified
longshoremen as business invitees and imposed upon shipowners the tradi-
tional landowner's duty, requiring them to inspect the ship for dangerous
conditions and to warn the longshoremen of any latent defects. 40 These courts
Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 494-97, 569 P.2d 1040, 1049-51 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1051 (1978). Some courts have suggested that the numerous references to land-based law
were made merely to emphasize departure from the warranty of seaworthiness and that maritime
negligence principles may be appropriate in cases under § 905(b). See Davis v. Inca Companla
Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. at 454-456; Gallardo v. Westfal-Larson & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. at
492; Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189, 1192-93 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Note, The
Injured Longshoreman vs. the Shipowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-Based Standards,
and Assumption of Risk, 28 Hastings L. J. 771 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Injured
Longshoreman]; Viewpoints, supra note 28, at 263-64. Although it appears that nondelegable
duties recognized in land-based law would be contrary to congressional intent, see Senate Report,
supra note 9, at 10-11, they are neither prohibited by the terms of the statute nor totally
precluded by the language of the committee report. See Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. AIS,
435 F. Supp. at 492; Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. at 499 n.22, 569 P.2d at 1052 n.22. In
rejecting a nondelegable duty as a basis for recovery ur.der § 905(b), the report explains that
longshoremen are not "endow[ed] . . . with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of
action." Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10 (emphasis added). See generally Theis, supra note 1,
at 777-90.
38. E.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (5th Cir. 1977);
Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Pan., 540 F.2d 757, 758-59 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 507-08 (2d Cir.
1976); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 40 n.12 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1975). But see
Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854, 863 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977)
(admiralty principles to be applied to the extent not inconsistent with § 905(b)). One commentator
has noted that the majority of courts interpret the legislative history as mandating application of
the "lowest common denominator" among land-based rules. See Robertson II, supra note 1, at
466. Higher duties under minority rules have been rejected in the name of uniformity. See, e.g.,
Birrer v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 386 F. Supp. 1105, 1108-12 (D. Or. 1974).
39. See, e.g., Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir.
1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1977); Bess v.
Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1975).
40. E.g., Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 869, 871-72 (E.D. La. 1976); Solsvik v.
Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Fitzgerald v.
Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. La. 1975); Slaughter v. S.S.
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also applied the common law "open and obvious" doctrine, barring recovery for
injuries caused by conditions that were either known to the longshoreman
or that he could have reasonably been expected to discover.41 A number of
circuit courts, however, held that the open and obvious doctrine improperly
incorporated into section 905(b) an assumption of the risk defense and was not
consistent with modem theories of landowner's liability. These courts chose to
adopt the formulation of the duty owed to invitees contained in sections 343
and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4 2
Section 343 of the Restatement, as applied to shipowners, imposes liability
for physical harm to longshoremen caused by conditions on the ship if: (1) the
shipowner knows of or would by the exercise of reasonable care discover the
condition; (2) he should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm;
(3) he should expect either that the longshoremen will not discover or realize
the danger or that they will fail to protect themselves against it; and (4) he
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against it.4 3 Section 343A
modifies the common law open and obvious doctrine by imposing liability on
the shipowner if he should anticipate the harm to the longshoreman
nothwithstanding that it is open and obvious. 4 4 Under section 343A, if the
shipowner should expect that the invitees will nonetheless proceed to en-
counter the danger, either because they are distracted or because a reasonable
person in their position would determine that the advantages outweigh the
risks, he will be under a duty to protect them.
4 5
Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637, 639-45 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes
Group, Ltd., 509 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 646
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Citizen v. M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Fedison v.
Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4, 7-8 (E.D. La. 1974). There is no question that the shipowner will
be liable for injuries caused by latent or hidden defects in the ship which are known to the
shipowner, e.g. Jacobs v. Tidewater Barge Lines, Inc., 277 Or. 809, 562 P.2d 545 (1977) (brace
buried in a cargo of grain), or which would be discovered by a reasonable inspection. Gary v.
Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 550 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. CL App. 1977) (rusted hatch cover latching
mechanism).
41. E.g., Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La. 1976); Citizen v.
M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4. 7
(E.D. La 1974); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Tex. 1974); see
Restatement of Torts § 340 (1934). But see Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nediloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398
F. Supp. 1224, 1229-30 (D. Or. 1975) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965));
Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1100-01 (D. Md. 1975) (same).
42. E.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977);
Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Pan., 540 F.2d 757, 759 (4th Cir. 1976), ctn. denied,
429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965); see W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61, at
392-93. Shipowners are of course liable for failure to carry on their own activities aboard the ship
with reasonable care. E.g., In re Allied Towing Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(explosion caused by loading improper grade of fuel oil); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 34 lA
(1965).
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965). The section is to be read in conjunction
with § 343. Id. § 343, Comment a.
45. Id. § 343A, Comment f; W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61, at 394. See generally Annot. 35
A.L.R.3d 230 (1971). This rule is also applied in situations in which the invitee would not
anticipate encountering such a dangerous condition, or for some reason would forget about its
existence. W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61, at 394.
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The Second Circuit's opinion in Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. 46 illustrates
the application of section 343A. In Napoli, a longshoreman had fallen from
some unsecured boards resting on drums stacked on the deck. 47 The court,
discussing the shipowner's duty regarding an open and obvious danger, stated
that if the longshoreman were required to stand on top of the drums to carry
out his duties, the shipowner might have anticipated that he would do so, and
would have a duty to protect him.4 8 Longshoremen also have prevailed under
section 343A when an openly dangerous condition existed on decks or
passageways which they had to cross in order to reach their work area4 9 and
46. 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id. at 509. The court did not require that the longshoreman have no other alternative but
"to leave his job or face trouble for delaying the work." Id.; accord, Davis v. Inca Companla
Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 (W.D. Wash. 1977). Under the modified open and
obvious rule, the plaintiff generally is not required to forgo employment in order to avoid an
obvious risk. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, Comment f, Illustration 5; see Foster v. A.P.
Jacobs & Assocs., 85 Cal. App. 2d 746, 193 P.2d 971 (1948); Seelbach, Inc. v. Mellman, 293 Ky.
790, 170 S.W.2d 18 (1943).
It should be noted that in Napoli, the shipowner had hired the longshoremen directly rather
than contracting with a stevedoring company, 536 F.2d at 506, and thus was an employer for
purposes of the LHWCA. Although several courts have declined to follow Napoli for this reason,
see Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S,
545 F.2d 854, 863-64 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977), such a distinction Is
inappropriate. In amending the LHWCA, Congress chose to retain the pre-1972 right of a
longshoreman to sue the shipowner for damages in this situation, and provided that the
shipowner's liability is to be determined by the same principles as in third-party suits. See Senate
Report, supra note 9, at 11. The second sentence of § 905(b) provides that there is no action for
damages if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons performing longshoring services.
The third sentence provides a similar exception in suits by shipbuilders or repairmen. Id. at
11-12. This exception, described as a fellow servant defense, is necessary in a direct employment
situation because the longshoremen are employees and the shipowner would otherwise be
vicariously liable for their negligence. See IA Benedict, supra note 26, § 115, at 6-16; Gorman,
supra note 1, at 16; note 8supra. In direct suits, courts make a distinction between the conduct of
the defendant in his role as a shipowner and as an employer, holding him liable for "owner
occasioned negligence" and excluding damages arising from the employer-employee relationship.
Smith v. M/ Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1977); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 40-44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. dinied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Duncan v.
Dravo Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.D. Pa. 1977); In re Allied Towing Corp., 416 F. Supp.
1207, 1209 (E.D. Va. 1976). Contra, Baker v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp, 84
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (refusing to allow direct suit); Buna v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp.
1360, 1366-67 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (same). Some courts, however, have read the language of the
second and third sentences of § 905(b) as providing a defense in ordinary third-party suits, see
Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1240 (5th Cir. 1977); Bovia v. S/S Agla
Erini, 433 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (E.D. La. 1977), and others have read it as exempting shipowners
from liability for t~e portion of the longshoreman's damages caused by the negligence of the
stevedore. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1155 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Shellman v. United States Lines
Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 370 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); see notes 184-89 infra and accompanying text.
49. Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1978) (grease), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358); Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440
F. Supp. 448, 452 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (grain); see Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F.
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when crew members instructed the longshoremen to continue working despite
a known unsafe condition. 50
Other courts applying section 343A, however, have taken a more restrictive
view in defining the point at which a shipowner should realize that a
longshoreman cannot protect himself from an obvious danger. In Gay v.
Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd.,S1 the Fifth Circuit held that a shipowner
was not liable when a boom, operated by longshoremen, knocked a pallet
stacked nearby into the hold injuring the plaintiff.52 Although crew members
knew of the presence of the pallet and had informed the stevedore that it
could not be placed on the dock, the court stated that they had no duty to
take protective measures under the circumstances because "[t]his was not the
type of danger that must be faced notwithstanding knowledge."5' 3 A similar
result has been reached in situations involving unsecured hatch covers S4
improper equipment,5 5 and grease on ladders and decks in the work area. s 6
Many courts interpreting section 343A in cases in which the dangerous
condition was known to both the shipowner and the longshoreman have held
for the shipowner on the grounds that a reasonable shipowner would not
anticipate the harm resulting from such dangers because he would reasonably
expect the stevedore either to remedy the condition or to warn his employ-
ees.5 7 This reasoning often prevents recovery because foremen or other
Supp. 1092, 1101 (D. Aid. 1975) (shipowner would have been liable if injury caused by grease on
ladder had occurred when longshoremen first came on board).
50. Lopez v. A/S DIS Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1978); Lubrano v Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 1240.
53. Id. at 1242.
54. Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Pan., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
55. Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977)
56. Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1102 (D. Md. 1975) (recovery
denied because stevedore made no attempt to correct condition for seven hours); see Wright v.
Adonis Compania Naviera, S.A., 59 Ill. App. 3d 108, 376 N.E.2d 4 (1978) (cargo covered with
grease).
57. E.g., Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 333-35 (5th Cir. 1977); Frasca
v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1101-02 (D. Md. 1975); Anuszewski v.
Dynamic Mariners Corp., Pan., 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D. Md. 1975), qffd, 540 F.2d 757 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); see Briley v. Charente S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 498, 500
(5th Cir. 1978); Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1109 (4th Cir. 1977); Robertson II,
supra note 1, at 473. Under the 1972 amendments, the primary responsibility for shipboard safety
rests on the stevedore. E.g., Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OIY, 576 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1978);
Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1977); Lucas v. -Brinknes" Schiffahrts
Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal
dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975). But see Napoli
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976) (when the danger is open and obvious
the court must consider whether the shipowner, "as the person best able to anticipate and prevent
harm from the obvious dangers on premises under his control, should not be under some duty to
take correction action").
In this connection, courts have rejected arguments that violations of the OSHA regulations
governing harbor employment, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1915-1918 (1977), are evidence of negligence on the
part of the shipowner, e.g., Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d at 1082; Gay v. Ocean
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employees of the stevedore generally supervise the work and longshoremen
direct their complaints about working conditions to them before going to the
shipowner.5 8
b. Dangers Unknown to the Shipowner-The Duty To Inspect
Section 343 imposes upon shipowners a duty to take protective measures
not only as to dangers within their actual knowledge but also as to those
which they could have been reasonably expected to discover. In other words,
shipowners must make a reasonable inspection of their vessels.5 9 The section,
however, does not define the scope or duration of the duty to inspect and
makes no distinction between dangerous conditions existing before the in-
vitees enter and those which arise thereafter and are caused by the invitees
themselves.
60
Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1977), despite some pre-1972 authority to
the contrary. See, e.g., Arthur v. Flota Mercante Gran Centro Americana S.A., 487 F.2d 561,
563-64 (5th Cir. 1973); Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Damskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 353 (4th
Cir. 1968); Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660, 666 (4th Cir. 1963). In
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1977), however, tile
court approved the use of regulations in nonjury trials as evidence of desirable safety standards
in the shipping industry. The regulations are by their terms directed at employers of harbor
workers and place no additional duties on shipowners. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1915.1(c)-(d), 1916.1(b),
1917.1(b), 1918.2(a)-(b) (1977).
58. See, e.g., Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978); Tallierco
v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 451 F. Supp. 949, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace
Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
59. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, Comments b, d (1965); W. Prosser, supra note 12, §
61, at 393. A shipowner may also incur liability for injuries caused by defects in any tools or
equipment he supplies. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 388-393 (1965). Under § 392, one who
supplies a chattel to be used for his business purposes is subject to liability for harm to the user if
he fails to exercise reasonable care in making it safe or discovering its dangerous condition and
warning the user. The supplier is liable even though the danger is discoverable by an Inspection
which the injured party or another is under a duty to make. Id. § 393. These sections have not
received much attention in LHWCA cases. In Castel v. Moller, A.P., 441 F. Supp. 851 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), a longshoreman standing on a portable ladder belonging to the shipowner was injured
when the ladder moved, in part because the rubber feet on the bottom of the ladder were missing.
The court, considering the lesser duty imposed by § 388, stated that the employer was under a
duty to provide a safe ladder to his employee, and that to shift liability because the plaintiff used
one belonging to the ship would be an unacceptable result. In addition, the court stated that there
must be proof that the ladder was defective at the time it was supplied. Id. at 853-54.
In addition to negligence theories, it is possible that a shipowner may be held liable under
nonmaritime theories of strict liability in his role as a supplier of chattels. Streach v. Associated
Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (strict liability cause of action not
prohibited when shipowner supplied a defective loading vehicle). Contra, Boncich v. M.P.
Howlett, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (no strict liability cause of action for a
defective cable on a barge-crane).
60. See Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The
comments to § 343 suggest such a distinction, stating that the landowner's and thus the
shipowner's liability arises out of an implied representation to the invitees that the premises have
been made safe for their reception and that they need not be on the alert to discover defects.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, Comments b, d (1965); see W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61,
at 388-89. The scope of the duty to inspect is limited to the "area of invitation" or parts of the
premises that are held open to the invitees. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332, Comment 1
(1965); W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61, at 391-92.
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Several courts have interpreted sections 343 and 343A as requiring shipown-
ers to provide longshoremen with a safe place to work initially but have
refused to impose any continuing duty to inspect the work of the stevedore 61
These courts believe that Congress intended that shipowners be permitted to
delegate their duty to provide a safe place to work to the stevedore and that
he is to have the primary responsibility to provide safe working conditions for
the longshoremen. 62 Based upon this interpretation, a shipowner was exon-
erated from liability to a longshoreman who suffered from carbon monoxide
poisoning when the stevedore ordered him to work in an unventilated
compartment and provided a defective blower. 63 Another court held for the
shipowner when a longshoreman was injured during the course of the work as
a result of the stevedore's failure to provide adequate dunnage. 6"
The Second Circuit applied a similar interpretation in Munoz v. Flota
Merchante Grancolombiana S.A. 65 There, the plaintiff was injured when he
fell from a makeshift pathway in the hold which had been constructed with
boxes of cargo by other longshoremen during the unloading. 66 Although the
shipowner was unaware of the dangerous condition, the plaintiff argued that
reasonable care required an inspection of the ship and correction of any
hazards. 67 The court held that recovery under the circumstances would be
contrary to congressional intent and set forth the following rule: "[A] ship-
owner cannot be liable in damages when he relinquishes control of the hold,
then in a reasonably safe condition, . . . and the stevedore's negligence creates
a latent, dangerous condition, unknown to the owner .. ,"68
Rather than merely holding that the shipowner has no duty to inspect the
progress of the longshoring operations, the Munoz court chose to distinguish
its earlier decision in Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.69 However, instead of
distinguishing it as a case in which the dangerous condition existed before the
work began,70 the Munoz court stated that Napoli was not controlling because
there the danger was open and obvious while in Munoz it was caused by a
latent condition.71 The court failed to note that the open and obvious rule
focuses upon the longshoreman's perception of the danger, and that its
distinction was directed at the shipowner's awareness. This distinction led to
61. See, e.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (Sth Cir. 1977);
Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-42 (4th Cir. 1975); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd,
B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1228-31 (D. Or. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097-1101 (D. Md. 1975).
62. See, e.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239 (Sth Cir. 1977);
Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1975).
63. Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (Sth Cir. 1977).
64. Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-42 (4th Cir. 1975).
65. 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 838-39.
67. Id. at 841.
68. Id.
69. 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed at notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
70. Although the Napoli opinion is unclear on this point, there was some evidence that the
plywood boards from which the plaintiff fell had been placed on top of the drums by the ship's
crew and thus constituted a preexisting hazard. Id. at 506; see Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OY,
576 F.2d 1072, 1079 (4th Cir. 1978).
71. 553 F.2d at 840-41.
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confusion in later cases regarding the shipowner's duty to inspect the vessel
before and after the longshoremen begin work. 72
Relying on Munoz and purporting to apply section 343, several courts have
abrogated the duty to inspect for preexisting dangers in the cargo itself or for
defects in the method of stowage. 7" These dangers are often created by
longshoremen in previous ports. In Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation
Co., 7 4 a longshoreman fell and was injured when he stepped into a hole
between two pallets of cargo which was covered by a rug. The stevedore who
had previously loaded the cargo had created the dangerous condition by
failing to cover the pallets with dunnage. 7" Although the danger was clearly
preexisting as to the plaintiff, the court held for the shipowner on the grounds
that no liability could be imposed for a failure to inspect or supervise and that
"[b]efore liability can attach for such independently created danger, the owner
must have knowledge of its existence and an opportunity to alleviate it."'7 6
c. Dangers Arising After Work Has Begun and Within
the Actual Knowledge of the Shipowner
The cases under sections 343 and 343A, though holding that a shipowner is
under no duty to inspect the ship during longshoring operations, suggest that
he may be liable if he has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition,
irrespective of when it arises, and fails to take corrective action. Several
circuit courts, without explicitly distinguishing between known and unknown
72. See, e.g., Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449 (2d
Cir. 1978); Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977); Valle v.
Jugoslavenska Linejska Plovidba, 434 F. Supp. 608, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It appears that the
Second Circuit has abandoned this interpretation of the open and obvious rule. See Cox v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798, 802 & n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 222
(1978). See also Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
73. See Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff fell
into space between pallets of cargo which was not covered with dunnage); Valle v. Jugoslavenska
Linejska Plovidba, 434 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff struck by a piece of dunnage
because of tilting of pallets during the voyage). See also Briley v. Charente S.S. Co., 572 F.2d
498 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's foot caught in separation netting covering carelessly loaded cargo);
Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 449 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (unsteady tier of cargo fell on
plaintiff); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiff lost
his footing on a dented cargo container). Courts applying independent contractor rules also have
held that there is no duty with respect to some preexisting dangers. See Wescott v. Impresas
Armadoras, S.A. Pan., 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977) (hold lacked proper fixtures for attaching
taglines); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff injured because of a failure to apply brakes to rolling cargo containers when loaded),
aff'd on rehearing en banc, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No.
78-479); Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff injured by collapsing
cargo which had been improperly stowed).
74. 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 862.
76. Id.; cf. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatiantique, 558 F.2d 186, 190 (4th Cir.
1977) (holding improper a jury instruction that a shipowner has a duty to see that cargo Is
properly stowed), affd on rehearing en banc, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct.
348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977) (stevedore
has primary duty for safe conditions in the hold); Valle v. Jugoslavenska Linejska Plovidba, 434
F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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conditions, have applied section 343A to conditions arising in the course of the
work that were known to the shipowner, 7 7 suggesting that shipowners have a
duty under those circumstances. Others have suggested that the shipowner's
awareness of the condition is relevant to the question of liability. 78 In
addition, several district courts have made an explicit distinction, stating that
after control of the ship is turned over to the stevedore, the shipowner
remains liable for a failure to warn or take corrective action with respect to
dangerous conditions he observes. 7 9
Dicta in a recent Second Circuit case also supports this approach. In Lopez
v. AIS DIS Svendborg,80 the court held that the fact that the risk of harm is
not recognized until unloading is in progress is no basis for failure to take
precautionary measures once the shipowner learns of the danger.81 The
absence of a duty to inspect or supervise the work, according to the Lopez
court, is relevant only to the notice to the shipowner. s 2 The Lopez opinion,
however, is in direct opposition to the earlier Second Circuit case of Cox v.
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. 8 3 In Cox, although the shipowner was
not only aware of the dangerous condition but had actually agreed to correct
it, the court held that he had no duty to do so and thus could not be held
liable for the resulting harm.8 4
77. Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean
Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977); see Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands
S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364, 374-76 (2d Cir. 1978); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521
F.2d 31, 45 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
78. See, e.g., Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977); Munoz
v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977); Bess v. Agromar Line,
518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975) (emphasizing the shipowner's unawareness of the danger in
question).
79. See Silverio v. Koninklijke Nederi. Stomb. Maats., 444 F. Supp. 415, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v.
Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 453 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-
Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 490, 496-98 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
80. 581 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
81. Id. at 324.
82. Id. at329 n.11. The statement in Rurffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1977), that the shipowner must have an opportunity to alleviate the danger before he can
be held liable was explained as "merely a timeliness gloss" on the requirement of notice: the
shipowner must know of the danger in sufficient time to correct it. Lopez v. AIS DIS Svendborg,
581 F.2d at 323; see Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1978) (liability
imposed when crew members had an opportunity to observe the unsafe condition after work had
begun and took no action), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358).
83. 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 222 (1978). Lope also appears to conflict
with Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam).
84. 577 F.2d at 800, 804. There is now a split among panels within the Second Circuit with
the decisions in Lopez and Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358), representing the liberal view and
the opinions in Cox and Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), representing the conservative view. The Canir.zo court declined to
follow Cox, suggesting that the Cox decision had done "what the Congress was unwilling to do,
abolish the shipowner's liability to the injured longshoreman in negligence as well as in
unseaworthiness." 579 F.2d at 686 n.3.
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2. Duty Owed by Employers of Independent Contractors-
Sections 409-429 of the Restatement
Perhaps in response to the difficulties encountered in attempting to adapt
sections 343 and 343A to LHWCA cases, the Third Circuit has explicitly
rejected the landowner-invitee analogy and instead has chosen to rely upon
the Restatement provisions dealing with the duty owed by an employer of an
independent contractor.8 5 The Ninth Circuit, although not expressly referring
to the Restatement, also appears to have adopted this approach. 8 6 In addi-
tion, independent contractor rules have been applied in several decisions from
circuits which had previously applied invitee rules in LHWCA cases.8 7 These
courts have confronted the same problems in defining the extent of the
shipowner's duty of inspection and in determining whether actual knowledge
on the part of the shipowner should give rise to a duty to take protective
measures. Thus, the body of case law that has developed under the indepen-
dent contractor rules is quite similar to, and as confusing as, that developed
by courts applying the invitee sections.
The basic rule under the independent contractor approach is found in
section 409 of the Restatement. Subject to numerous exceptions, "the em-
ployer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to
another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants."8 8 The
exceptions fall into two broad categories. The first category is situations in
which the employer is liable for his own personal negligence in connection
with the work entrusted to the contractor.8 " The second category is situations
in which the employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of the contractor,
irrespective of whether he himself is at fault, based upon a policy determina-
tion that the employer should not be permitted to shift responsibility for the
conduct and quality of the work. 90 The exceptions in this category have been
dismissed as contrary to congressional intent in enacting section 905(b). 9 1
85. Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1249-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977).
86. See Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Cc.., 569 F.2d 507, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1978);
Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Pan., 564 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1977).
87. See Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 222 (1978); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OIY, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978); Riddle v.
Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1110-16 (4th Cir. 1977); Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp.,
559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1489 (1978); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 279 Or. 477, 569 P.2d 1040 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
88. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965). The independent contractor rule Is an
exception to the principle that employers are subject to liability for the acts or omissions of
persons they employ. If there is an agency relationship and control over the details of the work,
the contractor will be considered a servant and the rule of vicarious liability will be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-220 (1958). The trend, however, is toward imposition of
vicarious liability even for the acts of independent contractors. The exceptions to the rule are so
numerous that it is only "applied where no good reason is found for departing from it."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409, Comment b (1965).
89. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 410-415 & Introductory Note, Topic 1 (1965); W.
Prosser, supra note 12, § 71, at 469-70; notes 137-43 infra and accompanying text.
90. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416-429 & Introductory Note, Topic 2 (1965); W.
Prosser, supra note 12, § 71, at 470-71. These exceptions are classified as nondelegable duties,
rendering the employer liable for the contractor's failure to discharge his duty of due care.
91. Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1081 (4th Cir. 1978); Hurst v. Triad
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In Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co. ,92 the Third Circuit chose to adopt the
independent contractor approach rather than the invitee sections for several
reasons. The Hurst court reasoned that the cases interpreting sections 343 and
343A had placed a duty upon shipowners to oversee longshoring operations to
protect longshoremen from dangers arising during their work and that, to that
extent, imposed an impermissible nondelegable duty upon shipowners. 93
The court also noted that application of the invitee rules caused confusion
because other courts avoided imposition of a nondelegable duty by evasive
readings of the sections and by classifying the danger in question as open and
obvious. 94 Moreover, the Third Circuit stated that exclusive reference to the
invitee rules was inappropriate in third-party suits because correct application
of land-based standards required that the independent contractor rules also be
taken into consideration.9" Finally, although section 343A is not as restrictive
as the common law open and obvious rule, the Hurst court criticized that
doctrine as incorporating the assumption of risk defense into section 905(b).96
The inquiry under section 409, in contrast to sections 343 and 343A, is not
into the perceptions of either the shipowner or the longshoreman or the
reasonableness of their conduct in light of it. Instead, courts applying section
409 are concerned with whether control of the ship and the manner of the
work was relinquished to the stevedore prior to the time the dangerous
condition arose and whether the condition was created by the shipowner or
the stevedore. 97 In Hurst, the plaintiff was injured when metal legs sus-
Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Brown v. Ivarans
Rederi AJS, 545 F.2d 854, 859-61 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); Teofilovich v.
d'Amico MediterraneanfPacific Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 734-36 (C.D. Cal. 1976). But see Johnson
v. Canadian Transp. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 127 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1976).
92. 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
93. Id. at 1249-50 n.35 (citing Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d SOS (2d Cir. 1976);
Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V., Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or. 1975)); see
Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
94. 554 F.2d at 1249-50 n.35 (citing Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233
(5th Cir. 1977); Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. La. 1976); Ramirez v.
Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974)).
95. Id. at 1249-50 n.35.
96. Id; see Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854, 863 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1977); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 495-96, 569 P.2d 1040, 1050 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
97. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text. The independent contractor rules have
been adopted in cases involving shipyard injuries even by courts which have applied the invitee
rules to dangerous conditions encountered by longshoremen in loading or unloading. See Riddle
v. Exxon Transp. Corp., 563 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977); Bossard v. Corp., 559 F.2d 1040
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Hess v. Upper Aliss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d
1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Harrelson v. United States, 420 F. Supp.
788 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affd, 548 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1977). When a ship has been turned over to a
shipyard for repairs or maintenance there is even less control exercised by the shipowner over the
manner of the work and no opportunity to observe or discover defects. Even when crew members
are present in the shipyard, they generally have less expertise in recognizing dangerous condi-
tions. Under these circumstances, it would be unfair to charge the shipowner with any continuing
responsibility for safe working conditions. Even with respect to dangers existing when the vessel
is turned over to the shipyard, the courts have applied the common law rule that there can be no
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pended from a crane fell into the hold where he was working because there
was no safety catch attaching them to the crane. 98 The court determined that
the stevedore was negligent in failing to secure the metal legs with a safety
catch and that section 409 insulated the shipowner from liability for the
stevedore's negligence unless one of the exceptions to the rule applied.99 The
only exception the Hurst court found relevant was section 414. 100 Section 414
imposes liability on the employer when he retains the right to control any
aspect of the work and is negligent in exercising that right.10 ' Under this
section, however, the shipowner may avoid liability to the longshoreman and
still retain "a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect
its progress or to receive reports."' 0 2 Although the Hurst court held for the
shipowner, presumably he would have been liable if he had retained sufficient
control over the manner in which the stevedore used the crane.
In addition to section 414, several other Restatement sections would not
impose nondelegable or no-fault liability on the shipowner, and, therefore, could
be applied in LHWCA cases. 10 3 Treatment of these sections has been disap-
pointing. Several courts have avoided their application by holding that they
are intended only to benefit third parties, not the contractor's employees.
10 4
Other courts have held that they are premised on the availability of indem-
nification, and, therefore, inappropriate in LHWCA cases.' 0 s
Thus, under the prevailing independent contractor analysis, the shipowner
may delegate his duty to provide a safe place to work and owes no further
duties to the longshoremen. 0 6 The courts refuse to impose liability on the
shipowner for failing to warn the plaintiff or correct the condition because to
recovery from an employer of an independent contractor for injuries caused by defective
conditions which the shipyard was hired to correct. Riddle v. Exxon Transp, Co., 563 F.2d at
1112; Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d at 1033; see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1375
(1953).
98. 554 F.2d at 1240-41.
99. Id. at 1251-53.
100. Id. at 1251.
101. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965).
102. Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d at 1251 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
414, Comment c (1965)); see Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Pan., 564 F.2d 875, 882-83
(9th Cir. 1977) (request for a certain method of separation in loading a cargo of grain Is not a
sufficient exercise of control). But see Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 501, 569
P.2d 1040, 1053 (1977) (disapproval of a method of stowage rendered the shipowner liable), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978). Negligent exercise of control may have been the rationae in other
cases as well. See Butler v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 537 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) (crew member Insisted
that counterweight be stowed in a dangerous position), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976);
Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or. 1975) (block placed In
a dangerous position by crew's opening of hatch).
103. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 410 (negligently given orders), 411 (negligent employ-
ment of an incompetent contractor), 413 (negligence in failing to provide for special precautions
when the work should be recognized as dangerous in their absence) (1965).
104. Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1081 (4th Cir. 1978); Hess v. Upper
Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
105. Teofilovich v. d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 734-36 (C.D. Cal.
1976); Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores S.A., 57 Cal. App. 3d 52, 62-63, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 32, 38 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v.
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do so would amount to charging the shipowner with the stevedore's negli-
gence. 107 In short, the courts refuse to accept any theory of concurrent duty or
responsibility apart from section 414.108 Thus, the shipowner is often insu-
lated from liability if the stevedore is at fault in causing the injury. Dicta in
several circuit court decisions indicates that the same result is obtained if the
shipowner is aware of a dangerous condition arising after control has been
relinquished. 10 9
II. RECENT TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The confusing and contradictory case law" to under section 905(b) in many
instances exempts shipowners from liability for their own negligence.I' This
state of affairs is contrary to Congress' intention that the federal courts
develop a uniform duty which will encourage safe working conditions." 12
Several recent district court opinions applying the recommendations of com-
mentators have recognized that shipowners should owe a higher duty regard-
ing conditions existing before the longshoremen come on board and conditions
that are unrelated to their work and that a more limited duty should exist
with respect to conditions arising out of the longshoring operations. 1 3 In
addition, these courts have criticized application of the more restrictive
common law rules relating to open and obvious dangers and classifications of
entrants as neither mandated by the language of the legislative history nor in
keeping with congressional intent." 4
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798, 804 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 99 S. Ct. 222
(1978).
107. See, e.g., Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), c'ert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 222 (1978); Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 569 F.2d 507. 514 (9th
Cir. 1978); Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Pan., 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977).
108. See, e.g., Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 99 S. Ct. 222 (1978); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OIY, 576 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir 1978),
Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 569 F.2d 507, S13-14 (9th Cir. 1978); Wescott v
Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Pan., 564 F.2d 875, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1977).
109. See, e.g., Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977); Hurst v. Triad
Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Kalogeros v. Brasileiro,
446 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Several district courts have reached this result. See. e.g,
Castel v. Moller, A.P., 441 F. Supp. 851, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Bovia v. SIS Agia Erini, 433 F
Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D. La. 1977); Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637, b40 tS.D Ga.
1974), aff'd sub nom. Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes Group, Ltd., 509 F 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 683, 685 (2d Cir. 197b). tert denied, 47
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd.. O1Y, 576 F.2d 1072,
1078 (4th Cir. 1978).
111. See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
112. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10, 12; note 130 infra.
113. See Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc.. 444 F. Supp. 405, 410-13 tS.D.N.Y. 1978,;
Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448. 453-57 tW.D. Wash. 1977). Gallardo
v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. AiS, 435 F. Supp. 484. 490, 496-98 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Robert!son II,
supra note 1, at 469-73; The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 37, at 791-92. See, also Croshaw
v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1229-30 (D. Or 1975); Frasca v.
Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1098-99 (D Md. 1975).
114. See Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448. 454-55 tW D Wash
1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A_/S. 435 F. Supp. 484, 493-95 (N.D. Cal. 1977); The
Injured Longshoreman, supra note 37, at 786-88; Viewpoints, supra note 28, at 260-62
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
A. A Uniform Rule of Reasonableness
Sections 343 and 343A should be abandoned to the extent that they define
the shipowner's duty in terms of the common law classifications based upon
the status of the plaintiff or in terms of the plaintiff's perceptions of the
dangerous condition. Although it is clear that longshoremen are invitees under
traditional land-based law, there is no justification for importing the
common law classifications into LHWCA cases.' "5 They were rejected twenty
years ago by the Supreme Court as foreign to the "traditions of simplicity and
practicality" of admiralty law, 1 6 and many state courts have abandoned the
classifications, recognizing that the common law landowner's duties are
inflexible and inconsistent with modern theories of tort law. "1
7
These state courts require a landowner to "act as a reasonable man in
maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the
circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of
the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk." ' 1 8 They have also stressed the
role of the jury in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, " 9
This approach is similar to an example given in the legislative history
involving an injury caused by an oil spill on the deck. The committee report
states that an injured longshoreman could recover if the oil "should have been
115. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
116. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.1625, 632 (1959).
117. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying District of
Columbia law), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d
731 (Alaska 1977); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968);
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City & County
of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So.
2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d
631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976);
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). The plaintiff's status may
be a factor in determining the care required. Other jurisdictions have abolished the distinctions
between licensees and invitees. E.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973);
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746
(N.D. 1977); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975). Still others lave
extended the duty of care to.social guests. E.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973);
Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975).
118. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying
District of Columbia law) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); see Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); Basso v.
Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976). In LHWCA
cases, customs and practices of the longshoring industry should be taken into consideration in
assessing the reasonableness of the shipowner's conduct, see, e.g., Butler v. O Finnllnes Ltd.,
537 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen &
Co. AIS, 435 F. Supp. 484, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1977), but should not prevent application of a higher
standard of care if industry practices are generally unsafe. See Davis v. Inca Companla Naviera
S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (liability imposed for injury caused by accumulation
of grain on the deck although it was customary not to clean the deck); W. Prosser, supra note 12,
§ 33, at 166-87.
119. E.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103 n.32, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(applying District of Columbia law), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 542-44, 489 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1971).
1978] SHIPOWNER'S DUTIES
discovered and removed by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care by the
vessel under the circumstances.
' 120
This example not only suggests a duty of reasonable care in LHWCA cases
but also demonstrates that the obviousness of the danger should not be
relevant to the shipowner's duty to take precautionary measures. The open
and obvious rule of section 343A is confusing and difficult to apply. It often
acts as a bar to recovery since many courts hold that a shipowner will
generally not anticipate the harm caused by an open and obvious condition
because he would reasonably expect it to be corrected by the stevedore. 12 1
More importantly, even as modified in section 343A, the open and obvious
rule incorporates into section 905(b) the assumption of risk doctrine which
was expressly prohibited as a defense in the legislative history. 22 A more
equitable and efficient way to deal with open and obvious dangers, and one
more in keeping with congressional intention, is to focus on the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's conduct instead of limiting the shipowner's duty. If the
plaintiff acted without due care for his own safety from an objective point of
view, his recovery should be reduced to the extent that his conduct caused the
injury.123 The committee report specifically provides that the concept of
comparative rather than contributory negligence is to be applied under section
905(b). 124
B. Shipowner's Responsibility for Conditions Existing
Before the Stevedore Comes on Board
The shipowner's initial duty to longshoremen should be to exercise reason-
able care in providing them with a safe place to work. 125 This duty of
120. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10-11.
121. See Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); note
57 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (W.D. Wash.
1977); Galardo v. Westfa-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Senate
Report, supra note 9, at 12; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, Comment e (1965); id. §
496C, Comment d; note 114 supra and accompanying text. Section 343A uses the concept as a
limitation on the duty owed by an occupier rather than as a defense. This distinction, however,
does not justify application of the section. See The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 37, at
781-82. But see Invitee Standard, supra note 29, at 671-76.
123. See Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 454 (W.D. Wash. 1977);
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Whether the
longshoreman was aware or should have been aware of the danger may be relevant in
determining if he acted with due care for his own safety in proceeding to encounter it. His
recovery, howevy', should not be reduced if he complains about a dangerous condition and is
told that it will be corrected or that he should keep working. The Injured Longshoreman, supra
note 37, at 781; see note 50 supra.
124. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 12. Section 343A has also been criticized in that by
defining the shipowner's duty in terms of the plaintiff's perceptions of the danger, it prevents
inquiry into the reasonableness of the shipowner's conduct and thus contravenes the policy of
comparative negligence which is aimed at balancing the relative fault of the parties. See Davis v.
Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 454 (W.D. Wash. 1977); The Injured
Longshoreman, supra note 37, at 782.
125. E.g., Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 507 (2d Cir. 1976); see Lopez v. AIS
D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1978); Migut v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 571 F.2d 352,
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reasonable care should be distinguished from any absolute duty or strict
liability theory. Congress has made it clear that the shipowner is no longer an
insurer of the safe condition of the vessel, and, accordingly, he should not be
liable for harm resulting from dangerous conditions which are unknown to
him and which he reasonably could not be expected to discover., 2 6 The
shipowner, however, should be under a dury to inspect the vessel before the
longshoremen come on board, and either take corrective action or warn the
longshoremen of dangers that he discovers. In addition, he should be liable
whenever a longshoreman is injured by a condition which would have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection. 127
The shipowner should not be able to avoid liability to the longshoremen
merely because he did not create the condition. Several courts have refused to
hold the shipowner responsible for dangerous conditions resulting from the
negligence of stevedores in earlier ports on the theory that to do so would be a
form of vicarious liability and contrary to congressional intent.12 8 It is
submitted, however, that imposing liability upon the shipowner under those
circumstances can be justified as a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable
care in providing a safe place to work, and, therefore, is not in conflict with
congressional intent. 129
Congress contemplated a duty to provide a safe place to work in order to
encourage safe working conditions. 130 Although shipowners are to be liable
only for their own negligence, the committee report explains that "nothing in
this bill is intended to derogate from the [shipowner's] responsibility to take
356 (6th Cir. 1978); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. AIS, 435 F. Supp. 484, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Croshaw
v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (D. Or. 1975); Shepler v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 506-08, 569 P.2d 1040, 1056 (1977) (dictum), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1051 (1978).
126. See, e.g., Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092,
1098-99 (D. Md. 1975); W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 61, at 393.
127. See, e.g., Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358). Samuels v. Empresa Linens Maritimas
Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1978); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F.
Supp. 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
128. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
129. See Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Samuels v. Empresa
Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978). Such liability is recognized in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 412 (1965) which provides: "One who is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to maintain land or chattels in such a condition as not to involve unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to others and who entrusts the work of repair and maintainenee to an
independent contractor, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to
exercise such care as the circumstances may reasonably require him to exercise to ascertain
whether the land or chattel is in reasonably safe condition after the contractor's work Is
completed."
130. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 2. The stevedore has an incentive to promote safe
working conditions because the premium he must pay his compensation carrier will reflect the
accident rate among his employees. See Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws 93-98 (1972). See also Senate Report, supra note 9, at 2. Congress believed
that shipowners should have a similar incentive. A proposal to eliminate the third party-suit
altogether by making shipowners secondarily liable for compensation benefits was rejected on the
ground that it would lead to unsafe working conditions. Id. at 10; see note 8 supra.
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appropriate corrective action where it knows or should have known about a
dangerous condition.' 3' This suggests that Congress intended that the ship-
owner's duties include an inspection of the ship and that liability under section
905(b) is not restricted to conditions created by the shipowner.
C. Shipowner's Responsibility for Conditions Arising Out
of and In the Course of the Longshoreman's Work
A more limited duty should be imposed upon the shipowner for conditions
which arise out of and in the course of the work.' 32 The rationale for this rule
is that because the stevedore has control over the work, it is regarded as his
enterprise, and, therefore, he is the proper party to prevent, bear, and
distribute the risks involved.133 Relieving the shipowner of vicarious liability
for the negligent acts of the stevedore would conform with congressional
intent in that it appears that under the 1972 amendments a shipowner may
delegate his responsibility to provide a safe place to work.134
Application of the rule, however, should be restricted to that part of the
work and those areas of the ship over which the stevedore has exclusive
control.1 35 The shipowner should remain under a continuing duty to discover
and take corrective action for conditions which arise while the longshoremen
are on board but which are unrelated to their work. 136 In addition, the
131. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10.
132. See note 113 supra and accompanying text See also Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 409-429 (1965); W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 71, at 468-69. In West v. United
States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), a shiprepair case, the Supreme Court stated that, although
shipowners have a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, "filt appears manifestly unfair
to apply the requirement . . . to the shipowner when he has no control over the ship or the
repairs, and the work of repair in effect creates the danger which makes the place unsrafe." Id. at
123; accord, Baum v. United States, 427 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970);
Patterson v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 423 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922
(1971); Vessella v. United States, 405 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1969); McDonald v. United States, 321
F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 969 (1964). The Second Circuit has recently
suggested that to exonerate a shipowner after he relinquishes control of the ship to the stevedore
is contrary to § 905(b) on the theory that relinquishment of control comes about pursuant to an
agreement between the parties and that § 905(b) prohibits agreements to shift liability. Lopez v.
A/S DIS Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978). It should be noted, however, that the
dangerous condition at issue in Lopez existed before the longshoremen began working, although it
was not discovered until the work was in progress. Id. at 321.
133. See Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 435
U.S. 924 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409, Comment b (1Q65),
134. See, e.g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.). cert. denied, 434 U S.
861 (1977); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (5th Cir 1977); Bess v.
Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1975); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co , 279 Or. 477,
507-08, 569 P.2d 1040, 1056 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1Q78). See also Senate Report,
supra note 9, at 10-11.
135. See, e.g., Kalogeros v. Brasileiro, 446 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y 1Q78) (holding for the
shipowner because of insufficient evidence); Herron v. Regent Daisy Shipping Co , 428 F. Supp.
757, 759 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
136. See, e.g., Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978), aert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358); Herron v. Regent Daisy Shipping Co., 428
F. Supp. 757, 759 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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shipowner should not be insulated from liability because a preexisting danger-
ous condition was not discovered until work began.' 37 Although control has
been relinquished to the stevedore and the shipowner is no longer under a
duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, he should not be relieved of
all liability for injuries to longshoremen.
The shipowner also should remain liable for his personal negligence in
connection with the contracted work. 138 The various duties that are placed
upon employers of independent contractors under land-based principles are
outlined in sections 410 to 415 of the Restatement. Under these sections,
liability is not based upon the contractor's negligence, and, therefore, they are
appropriate in LHWCA cases even when the stevedore is also at fault.139 If
the shipowner's negligence has contributed to the injury, negligence on the
part of the stevedore should not shield him from liability. Post-1972 cases
have recognized that there may be concurrent responsibility for shipboard
injuries1 40 and have unanimously rejected the argument that the shipowner is
liable under section 905(b) only when his negligence is the sole cause of the
injury.' 4  Therefore, the courts should focus upon the conduct of the ship-
owner and not solely upon the conduct of the stevedore. 142
Section 414 of the Restatement, which has been applied in LHWCA cases,
imposes liability on a shipowner who negligently exercises a right to control
the work. 143 Although it is clear that under section 414 a shipowner may
inspect the progress of the work without incurring liability, if he requests or
disapproves of a specific method of stowage or in any way interferes with the
details of the loading or unloading, he should be liable to the extent that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm. 44 The cases decided under
137. Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1978); see Samuels v. Empresa
Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co.,
431 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D. Mass. 1977).
138. E.g., Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978) (ship's officer
told longshoreman to continue working without dunnage); Butler v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 537
F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) (crewman told longshoreman to stow counterweight In a dangerous
position), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 569 P.2d
1040 (1977) (shipowner disapproved safer method of stowage), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978);
see Lopez v. A/S DIS Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 409-415, Introductory Note, Topic 1 (1965). The
legislative history excludes only liability for negligence of the stevedore or his employees. Senate
Report, supra note 9, at 11.
140. See, e.g., Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1978); Lubrano v.
Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1978); Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., 431
F. Supp. 869, 872 (D. Mass. 1977); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F.
Supp. 1224, 1231 (D. Or. 1975).
141. E.g., Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379
F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
142. See, e.g., Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 488 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1977). This is the
general rule in nonmaritime third-party suits as well. The employer's concurrent negligence is not
a defense. See 2A Larson, supra note 12, § 75.22.
143. See notes 101-102 supra and accompanying tet.
144. Id. Under land-based law, in addition to inspecting the work, landowners may have a
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section 343A, holding shipowners liable when they order longshoremen to
continue working in the face of a dangerous condition, 41 could also be
explained by reference to this section.
The remaining Restatement duties should also be applied to shipowners.
Under section 410 of the Restatement the shipowner would be liable for
injuries resulting from conduct by the stevedore pursuant to the shipowner's
directions that the shipowner should know will create an unreasonable risk of
harm. 146 In addition, the shipowner would be liable under section 411 for
harm resulting from the negligent employment of an incompetent steve-
dore. 147 Section 413 imposes an additional duty upon land-based parties who
employ an independent contractor to do work which should be recognized
as likely to create a peculiar risk of harm in the absence of special precau-
tions. 148 The employer is liable for any harm caused by his failure to provide
for the special precautions by contract or otherwise. The issue in LHWCA
cases is whether longshoring can be considered peculiarly dangerous in the
absence of special precautions. Although it is among the most dangerous
occupations, 14 9 courts thus far have refused to hold that longshoring involves
any peculiar risk.'50 One may argue, however, that although some of the
safety inspector and a coordinator present, e.g., Wolfe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 460 F.2d 675
(7th Cir. 1972), may make suggestions to the independent contractor, e.g., Foster v. National
Starch & Chem. Co., 500 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1974), and may order compliance with a term of the
contract as long as the method is not specified. E.g., DeVille v. Shell Oil Co., 366 F.2d 123 (9th
Cir. 1966); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, Comment c (1965). But if there is a retention
of a right of supervision such "that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own
way"-for example, the right to direct the order in which the work is to be done or prohibit
dangerous methods---negligent exercise of the power may give rise to liability. Id. § 414,
Comments a, c; see, e.g., Summers v. Crown Constr. Co. 453 F.2d 998, 1000 (4th Cir. 1972).
Interference or negligent instructions gave rise to liability in pre-1972 maritime cases as well. See,
e.g., United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 (1959)
(shipowner directed use of carbon tetrachloride to clean generators); Croley v. Matson Navigation
Co., 439 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1971) (shipowner directed use of an explosive preservative).
145. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
146. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 410 (1965). The rationale for § 410 is that the employer
is liable for harm caused by an act or omission which he directs as though the act or omission
were his own. Id. § 410, Comment a. Further, if the employer retains the power to alter his
directions, he may be liable for permitting the work to continue under this section. Id. § 410,
Comment g.
147. Id. § 411. Under this section, a shipowner would be guilty of negligent selection of a
stevedore if he knows or should know that a particular stevedore lacks knowledge, skill,
experience, or proper equipment such that his employment will create an unreasonable risk of
harm to longshoremen. See id. § 411, Comment a. Some states have extended the rule to
situations in which the employer negligently fails to engage a solvent or adequately insured
contractor. E.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying New
Jersey law), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
148. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965). Section 413 is not directed at situations
involving risks which are normal, routine, or customary, but rather "to a special, recognizable
danger arising out of the work itself." Id. § 413, Comment b. Examples given in the comments
include excavations and demolition of buildings. Id. § 413, Comment c.
149. See note 8 supra.
150. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D.
La. 1975); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp. Pan., 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D. Md. 1975),
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more routine tasks performed by longshoremen do not merit special precau-
tions, workers who handle cargo which is either inherently dangerous or
difficult to load and unload safely because of its size or weight should be
entitled to the protection of this section. In addition, section 413 should be
applied when the design of the ship or the lack of proper equipment on board
makes the work particularly hazardous.
A final area of disagreement in LHWCA cases is the shipowner's obligation
to warn of dangerous conditions within his actual knowledge during longshor-
ing operations. 1 51 Although the shipowner should have no duty to inspect and
should not be held liable for conditions unknown to him once the work has
begun, he should not be permitted to remain silent when he observes a
dangerous condition. The shipowner often has actual knowledge of conditions
that arise during longshoring operations even though control of the work may
rest on the stevedore; a crew member is generally present to prevent pilferage
and to see that the cargo and ship are not damaged. 152 Several recent district
court decisions have recognized that shipowners should at least have a duty to
warn the longshoreman when they observe a condition and know or should
know that it poses an unreasonable risk of harm. 153 There is some authority
under land-based law for such a duty, 154 and it is implicit in several cases that
aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2.d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Robertson 1I,
supra note 1, at 466-67. But see Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1978);
Johnson v. Canadian Transp. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 327, 838, 127 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1976).
Section 413 has also been rejected on the ground that it is premised on the general availability of
indemnity from the contractor under land-based law which is not available under § 905(b). See
Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A., 57 Cal. App. 3d 52, 62, 129 Cal. Rptr. 32, 38
(1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413, Comment e (1965); id. § 416, Comment c. See also
Teofilovich v. d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1976). A
third objection is based on the Tenth Circuit's view that § 413 is not available to land-based
employees of the contractor. See Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corp., 422 F.2d 610, 614 (10th Cir.
1970); Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 635-36 (10th Cir. 1967); note 104 supra. But see
Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495, 499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (§ 413 applicable to
employees of independent contractors covered by the LHWCA).
151. See notes 77-84, 109 supra and accompanying text.
152. See Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
153. Id. at 413; Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 455-57 (W.D.
Wash. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 496-97 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 37, at 788-90. See also Robertson II, supra note 1, at
471-73. These courts and commentators propose that shipowners be under a duty to provide a
safe place to work or a duty to exercise reasonable care at all times, but that liability for dangers
arising after longshoring operations have begun can be imposed only when the shipowner has
actual knowledge of the condition. They have rejected an analysis based upon retention or
relinquishment of control as inconsistent with a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances
and have pointed out that some courts have abused the doctrine. See Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen
& Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 495-96 (N.D. Cal. 1977); The Injured Longshoreman, supra note
37, at 792-95. It is unclear how a more limited duty after the work has begun is significantly
different from one commencing with relinquishment of control. It is submitted, however, that a
distinction based upon relinquishment of control is preferable. If the shipowner retains control of
the vessel and the work, he should not be absolved of the duty to provide a safe place to work,
notwithstanding the fact that work has begun.
154. See, e.g., Warren v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 477 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1973);
Emelwon, Inc., v. United States, 391 F.2d 9, 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968);
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have applied section 343A without regard to when the danger arose. 155 In
addition, the burden on shipowners would be minimal when compared wvith
the risk of harm to the longshoremen. More importantly, such a duty would
further the congressional goal of promoting safe working conditions.
D. Conclusion
At the present time the outcome of longshore cases even within individual
circuits is unpredictable. More importantly, the results reached are often
unfair to both longshoremen and shipowners. It is submitted that the aforemen-
tioned recommendations are consistent with congressional intent and will
provide a flexible, equitable method by which to judge the conduct of
shipowners.
Congress has eliminated the unseaworthiness remedy but has specifically
provided for liability when the shipowner's negligence is responsible for the
injury.1 5 6 Although the legislative history states that longshoremen are to be
in no better position than land-based workers, neither are they to be in a
worse position. Regardless of their own views on the propriety of third-party
suits, 5 7 courts should formulate a duty in keeping not only with generally
"accepted principles of tort law"' 58 but also with the congressional goals of
safety and uniformity.
It should be remembered that regardless of how the courts interpret the
duty under section 905(b), a shipowner is liable only when a hazard poses an
unreasonable risk of harm and then only if a reasonable shipowner would
Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 1977). See also Sposito v.
Zeitz, 23 Wis. 2d 159, 163, 127 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1964).
155. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
156. In this connection, the Second Circuit has noted that statutory benefits do not fully
compensate injured workers and that "while Congress was willing to shift the burden of injury
without fault to an improved compensation system... it was not willing.. . to shift the burden
of injury through the fault of the ship." Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 686-87 n.3
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No. 78-358).
157. It is unclear why courts interpreting § 905(b) place such a limited duty on shipowners,
especially when decisions in land-based cases are doing away with many of the common law rules
that formerly prevented recovery. One factor may be the unavailability of contribution or
indemnity from a stevedore who is also at fault in causing the injury. Courts are reluctant to
recognize divided responsibility for the injury when it appears that responsibility for payment of
the judgment will not be divided. See Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 687-88 (2d
Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978) (No.
78-358); Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 924 (1978); Castel v. Moller, A.P. 441 F. Supp. 851, 853 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Teofilovich v. d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1976);
Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A., 57 Cal. App. 3d 52, 62, 129 Cal. Rptr. 32, 38
(1976). Another possible explanation for the restrictive reading of § 905(b) is that longshoremen
are victims of a "judicial backlash." For years lower courts, inundated with a flood of longshore
injury cases, resisted application of the Supreme Court's liberal remedies. See DJS Ove Skou v.
Herbert, 365 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); G. Gilmore & C.
Black, supra note 6, § 6-1(a), at 274. See also H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
131-32 (1973). Now, perhaps, they are overreacting with a flood of pro-shipowner decisions,
replacing the excesses of the circular liability suit with an equally unfair interpretation of the
LHWCA. See The Injured Longshorenian, supra note 37, at 799. See generally Viewpoints, supra
note 28, at 251-52.
158. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 11.
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appreciate the risk involved. 15 9 Moreover, the shipowner is required to use
only reasonable care in discharging his duties 160 and the plaintiff must prove
that any negligence by the shipowner was the proximate cause of his in-
juries. 16 1 It is submitted that courts should look to these limitations on
liability rather than restricting liability by narrowing the shipowner's duty.
Il. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
A. The Nature of the Controversy
By replacing the longshoreman's unseaworthiness action against the ship-
owner with one based on negligence, Congress eliminated only one half of the
circular liability suit. The second step was to eliminate the warranty of
workmanlike performance which had required stevedores to indemnify ship-
owners for amounts recovered by longshoremen in unseaworthiness ac-
tions. 162 Thus, section 905(b) provides that stevedores are not liable "directly
or indirectly" for damages recovered by longshoremen and in addition prohib-
its any agreements or warranties to the contrary. 163 Congress reasoned that
because the shipowner's liability is now based upon his own negligence and not
on any fault of the stevedore, it is no longer necessary to permit shipowners
to recover from the stevedore damages paid to the longshoremen. 164 Elimina-
tion of absolute liability, however, has not resolved the problem of appor-
tionment of liability between shipowners and stevedores but has merely
limited it to cases in which the shipowner's negligence contributed to the
injury.
It seems clear from the language of section 905(b) and from the legislative
history that Congress intended to prohibit not only indemnity actions, but also
any contribution from the stevedore, whether measured by the stevedore's
fault in causing the injury or by the amount of compensation benefits he has
paid. 165 This, however, leaves shipowners in a rather unfortunate position
159. See W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 31, at 145-49.
160. Id.; see note 120 supra and accompanying text.
161. See Tallierco v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 451 F. Supp. 949, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
162. See note i1 supra and accompanying text.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
164. Senate Report, supwa note 9, at 11. Insulation of the stevedore from liability to the
shipowner was also tied to the increase in compensation benefits. The Senate Report states that
stevedores were willing to pay higher benefits only if they were protected from any other liability.
Id. at 5.
165. See, e.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.
1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1975), ceri.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 761 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl.
denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). The Senate Report states: "It is the Committee's intention to
prohibit such recovery under any theory including, withoul limitation, theories based on contract
or tort." Senate Report, supra note 9, at 11.
It is uncertain whether third parties other than shipowners can assert claims for contribution or
indemnification against a negligent stevedore. Several courts have held that § 905(b) is directed
only at the shipowner-stevedore relationship and that the LHWCA's exclusive liability provision,
33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976), does not prohibit recovery over in other situations. E.g., Gould v.
General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (allowed indemnity action); Brkaric v.
Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (allowed claims for contribution);
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when injuries are caused by concurrent fault. Without some mechanism to
shift part of the loss, the negligent shipowner is liable to the injured
longshoreman for the full amount of his damages regardless of the extent to
which the stevedore contributed to the injury. 166 In addition, the stevedore is
not only free from responsibility to pay any part of the damages but he, or his
compensation carrier, 167 has a lien on the longshoreman's recovery-a right to
recoup the compensation benefits he has paid under the LHWCA in the event
the longshoreman's suit against the shipowner is successful. 168 Because sec-
tion 905(b) prohibits any shifting of liability for the damages to the stevedore
by indemnity or contribution, shipowners are claiming entitlement to a credit
or offset-reduction of the longshoreman's recovery by imputing the steve-
dore's negligence to him combined with either reduction or elimination of the
stevedore's lien. 16
9
Shipowners have proposed several types of credits including a pro tanto
credit, a pro rata credit, and an equitable credit. A pro tanto credit reduces
the longshoreman's recovery against the shipowner by the amount of compen-
sation benefits paid by the negligent stevedore and denies the stevedore any
right of reimbursement.17 0 Thus, the plaintiff is made whole, the stevedore's
Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat Serv., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1975) (upheld
indemnity agreement); see Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978) (contribution
and tort indemnification barred by § 905(a) but possibility of contractual indemnity left open);
Nieves v. Douglas S.S., Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Robertson I, supra note
1, at 540-42. But see Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Myers v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 656, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1977); S.S. Seatrain La. v.
California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 184 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Fitzgerald v.
Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 411 (E.D. La. 1974); cf. Davis v. Chas. Kurz
& Co., 483 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1973) (contractual indemnification unavailable unless the third
party is subject to liability for unseaworthiness); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros.
Oilfield Serv., Inc., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967) (same).
166. See, e.g., Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975) (shipowner
was 30% negligent, stevedore was 70% negligent, damages were $15,485), cell. denied, 425 U.S.
936 (1976); 57 Or. L. Rev. 487, 488-89 (1978) (citing Brief for Appellant at A-6 to -7, Shepler v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477, 569 P.2d 1040 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978)
(shipowner was 28% negligent, stevedore was 72% negligent, damages were $500,000)).
167. When a stevedore's insurance company has assumed payment of compensation, it is
subrogated to all the rights of the stevedore. 33 U.S.C. § 933(h) (1976).
168. See notes 224-232 infra and accompanying text.
169. Plans to apportion liability by means of a credit to shipowners have numerous suppor-
ters. See Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial Accident Litigation, 19
N.Y.L.F. 587 (1974); Coleman, The 1972 Amendments to the LHIVCA: Life Expectancy of an
Equitable Credit, 12 Forum 683 (1977); Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment of
Damages According to Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 35 Md. L. Rev. 351 (1976); Shorter, In
the Wake of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act: The Vessel's Rights Against the Stevedore, 7 J. Mar. L. & Com. 671 (1976); Vickery, supra
note 1. But see Robertson II, supra note 1, at 484; Steinberg, The 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Negligence Actions by Longshoremen
Against Shipowners-A Proposed Solution, 37 Ohio SL L.J. 767 (1976).
170. See, e.g., Shorter, supra note 169, at 678. For example, if the plaintiff received $4,000 in
compensation benefits and his damages were $10,000, the shipowner would be liable to the
plaintiff for only $6,000 and the plaintiff would be entitled to retain the $4,000 in benefits.
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liability does not exceed the benefits provided in the statute, and the ship-
owner is given some relief from the burden of paying full damages. The pro
tanto credit, however, has been criticized as arbitrary because it fails to take
into account the relative fault of the stevedore and the shipowner, 171 and has
uniformly been rejected in LHWCA cases.' 72
A second possibility for apportionment of damages is the pro rata credit. In
Murray v. United States,' 73 the District of Columbia Circuit held that under
the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 174 a third party sued by a gov-
ernment employee is entitled to a fifty percent reduction in the damages
award if the government is at fault in causing the injury. 175 The Murray rule
The pro tanto credit has some support under state law. E.g., Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57,
366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C.
559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); Poindexter v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 286, 69 S.E.2d 495
(1952). Other states permit pro tanto contribution. The third party tortfeasor is obliged to pay the
judgment in full and the employer retains his lien on the recovery but the third party may obtain
contribution from a negligent employer up to the amount of the compensation benefits paid. E.g.,
Lambetson v. Cincinnati Corp., - Minn. -, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977); John W.
Brown, Jr. Equip. Rental Corp. v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Mao v. Fahs, 339
Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940); see Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 726 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978)
(expressing approval of pro tanto contribution but holding that it is prohibited under the
LHWCA).
171. See Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 605. Under any given set of facts, whether a
party is 10% or 90% negligent, its liability remains the same because the amount of workmen's
compensation benefits is determined by the nature and severity of the injury without regard to
fault. From case to case, the relative liability of the parties would depend on the differential
between statutory benefits and common law damages for the injury in question, One court has
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975), requiring apportionment of damages based upon comparative fault in collision cases, would
require that the same principle be applied in personal injury cases. See Griffith v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). Thus,
any credit not based upon comparative fault is of questionable validity.
172. See, e.g., Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 760 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Fritz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G.,
379 F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
173. 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
174. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1976). The Federal Employee's Compensation Act (FECA) is the
workmen's compensation statute for federal civilian employees and has an exclusive liability
provision, id. § 8116(c), similar to § 905(a) of the LHWCA.
175. 405 F.2d at 1365-66. If two third parties were sued, each presumably would be entitled
to a one third credit. See Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 603. The Murray court found
support for a credit by comparing third-party suits to situations where one of two joint tortfeasors
settles a claim with the victim. 405 F.2d at 1365. Under the District of Columbia rule, the
nonsettling tortfeasor is entitled to have a judgment against him reduced by one half on the
theory that the victim has sold half the claim. Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir.
1962). The Murray court made an analogy between settlement of a claim and the compromise
inherent in workmen's compensation statutes. In return for no-fault benefits, the worker has In
effect "sold" his claim against the third party who would have been entitled to contribution but
for the employer's immunity from any other liability to the employee. 405 F.2d at 1365-66.
The Murray rationale has been criticized because, in cases of settlement, the plaintiff has
voluntarily reduced his judgment against the remaining tortfeasor and there is no question of a
right to reimbursement. See Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co.,
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has been extended to LHWCA cases involving nonmaritime employees in the
District of Columbia.1 76 This extension, however, has not been tested under
the 1972 amendments and its precedential value for application of a credit to
longshore cases is doubtful. 177
Litigation under the 1972 amendments has centered primarily on the
equitable credit, first proposed in a 1974 law review article. 178 Under the
equitable credit, the shipowner's liability is restricted to the percentage of the
damages caused by his proportionate fault. 179 The stevedore's lien, rather
than being automatically eliminated, is reduced to the extent that his negli-
gence reduced the recovery of the longshoreman from the shipowner. s0 For
example, assume that a longshoreman suffers $10,000 in damages resulting
from a shipboard injury and his LHWCA benefits amount to $4,000. In
addition, assume that the shipowner is twenty percent negligent in causing the
injury and the stevedore is eighty percent at fault. If an equitable credit were
applied, the plaintiff would receive $2,000 from the shipowner instead of
$10,000, because the shipowner was only twenty percent negligent, and also
would be entitled to keep the $4,000 in compensation benefits. The stevedore,
whose negligence reduced the plaintiff's recovery by $8,000, would recover no
part of his lien, but would not be liable to the plaintiff for any additional
K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30,
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co.. 152 N.J. Super. 471,
487-88, 378 A.2d 53, 61-62 (Law Div. 1977) (refusing to employ a Murray credit under the New
Jersey workmen's compensation statute); 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, § 76.22. at 14-317 to -318.
The question of the employer's right to reimbursement under a pro rata credit was not
addressed in Murray and remains undecided. Commentators have differing views orn what the
court intended. See 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, § 76.22, at 14-318 (employer would still be
permitted to enforce a lien on the recovery); Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169. at 597
(negligent employer forfeits his lien); Steinberg, supra note 169, at 783 n.97 (employer's lien would
be reduced in relation to its fault); Vickery, supra note 1, at 67 n.20 (lien would be reduced by
50%). Although the logic of the Murray credit requires that the lien be reduced in some way, see
Turner v. Excavation Constr., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971), reduction would be
contrary to the FECA provision providing for reimbursement, 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (1976). which
exists despite negligence on the part of the government. Randall v. United States, 282 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
176. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729-30 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(dictum). The LHVCA is the workmen's compensation statute for private employers in the
District of Columbia. D.C. Code Encycl. § 36-501 (West 1968). Despite criticism on the part of
district courts, e.g., Anthony v. Norfleet, 330 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D.D.C. 1971); Turner v.
Excavation Constr. Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1971), the Dawson court stated that "we
assume the continuing validity of the Murray [credit) and its application to cases involving the
[LH VCA]." 467 F.2d at 729-30 n.3.
177. The Murray credit has been rejected in longshore cases as "unneccessarily arbitrary and
inflexible." Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224. 1232 (D. Or.
1975); accord, Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 3t2. 367-68 (C.D
Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). But see
Vickery, supra note 1, at 66-67.
178. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 606-07; see Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at
355-62. A district judge is credited with coining the term. See Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines,
Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143, 1144 (D. Md.), rendered moot, 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 19753.
179. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 606; Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 357-58.
180. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 606; Coleman & Daly. supra note 169, at 358-59
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payments. 18 Thus, the equitable credit not only apportions liability between
the stevedore and the shipowner, but also affects the plaintiff's recovery.
Whenever the portion of the damages attributable to the stevedore's negli-
gence exceeds the amount of compensation he has paid, the equitable credit
reduces the amount the plaintiff normally would receive from the ship-
owner. 1
82
B. Reduction of the Longshoreman's
Recovery from the Shipowner
1. Statutory Language
The Fourth Circuit is the only court which has held that section 905(b)
actually provides for reduction of the longshoreman's recovery. 183 In Ed-
monds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,1 8 4 the court construed the
language of the section as restricting the shipowner's liability to its propor-
tionate share of the damages.' 8 5 The court based its interpretation of section
905(b) upon a conflict it perceived between the first sentence, providing for a
negligence action, and the second sentence, stating that if the plaintiff is
employed by the shipowner he may not recover when his injury is caused by
persons providing stevedoring services. The court stated that "[t]he sentences
are irreconcilable if read to mean that any negligence on the part of the ship
will warrant recovery while any negligence on the part of the stevedore will
defeat it. '" 1 8 6 The only method of harmonizing section 905(b), according to the
Edmonds court, was to read it as insulating the shipowner from damages
caused by the stevedore's negligence.' 8 7 The court reasoned that it was
"hardly rational" to suppose that Congress intended shipowners to be required
to pay the full amount of the damages when they are only slightly at fault. 188
181. Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 606-0'; Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at
358-62. If instead, the shipowner had been 80% negligent and the stevedore 20% negligent, tile
stevedore would be entitled to $2,000 from the recovery-$4,000 (the total amount of the lien) less
$2,000 (the amount by which the stevedore caused the plaintiff's recovery to be reduced). Tlhe
stevedore, therefore, is entitled to partial reimbursement whenever his proportionate fault In
causing the injury is such that it reduces the recovery against the shipowner by less than he was
obliged to pay in compensation benefits.
A variation of the equitable credit has been proposed whereby the stevedore's right of
reimbursement is never totally eliminated but rather is reduced in proportion to his fault In
causing the injury. Under the above facts, the lien of the negligent stevedore would be reduced by
$3,200 (80% of $4,000). See Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34 (W.D.
Wash. 1975) (outlining this variation of the equitable credit); Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at
360 n.33.
182. Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 359.
183. Edmonds v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1155.
186. Id.; accord, Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 370
(C.D. Cal. 1974) (the second and third sentences compel reduction of the judgment against the
shipowner), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
187. 577 F.2d at 1155. See also Coleman, supra note 169, at 684; Coleman & Daly, snpra note
169, at 369.
188. 577 F.2d at 1155. The Fourth Circuit did nol expressly decide the question of the
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A careful reading of the legislative history, however, undermines the
rationale of Edmonds. Although the section itself is ambiguous, it is clear from
the committee report that the second and third sentences are directed at
situations in which harbor workers are hired directly by the shipowner and
there is considerable authority interpreting the statute in this manner.18 9 The
statute itself, therefore, does not address the question of the longshoreman's
right to a full damage recovery from the shipowner.
2. Legislative Intent
Supporters of the credit have argued that the legislative history supports a
limitation on the shipowner's liability for damages. They have interpreted
passages in the legislative history stating that under the 1972 amendments
shipowners "will not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore"190 as
evidencing congressional intention to restrict recoveries against shipowners to
their proportionate share of the damages incurred by longshoremen.' l9 In this
connection, proponents of a credit have argued that reduction of the ship-
owner's liability was an ingredient in the compromise arrived at in enacting
the 1972 amendments. They contend that limiting shipowner's liability was a
quid pro quo for eliminating the shipowner's right to indemnification from the
stevedore. 192
Courts favoring a credit have also relied upon the ambiguities in section
905(b) and the legislative history as a justification for supplementing the
LHWCA with a credit doctrine. 193 One court viewed the 1972 amendments as
containing a "catch-22" in that neither shipowners nor stevedores were to be
liable for the stevedore's negligence but injured longshoremen were entitled to
damages for it.' 94 The court, however, observed that Congress provided for
comparative negligence, leaving "the mechanics of its application to the
courts."'
1 9 5
stevedore's rights but stated that his lien may be subject to an adjustment because the stevedore's
negligence resulted in a reduction of the plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 1156. The court suggested that
the shipowner pay the judgment into the court and interplead the stevedore and that they be
made party plaintiffs in the future. Id.
189. See note 48 supra. Several commentators have criticized the court in Shellman v. United
States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 370 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976) for relying on the second and third sentences as
authority for a credit. See Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 388-89; Robertson II, supna note 1,
at 484; Steinberg, supra note 169, at 781-82 & n.2.
190. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 11.
191. See Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 169, at 605-07; Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at
372; Vickery, supra note 1, at 66.
192. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, IIS5-56
n.2 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. CL 348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Coleman &
Daly, supra note 169, at 373.
193. See Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1232-33 (D.
Or. 1975); Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 367-70 (C.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Coleman & Daly,
supra note 169, at 374-75.
194. Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (D Or.
1975).
195. Id. at 1233; see Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 367
(C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
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In addition, pro-credit courts, based upon equitable considerations, have
determined that shipowners must be given some relief from the burden of
paying damages attributable to the stevedore's fault even if it results in
reduced recoveries for longshoremen. 196 They have attempted to justify
reduction of the recovery on the theory that longshoremen should not be
entitled to receive damages for the portion of their injuries attributable to the
stevedore's negligence because, having accepted no-fault compensation ben-
efits, they have waived any tort claim based on their employer's negli-
gence.1 97
Finally, courts favoring application of a credit have relied heavily upon the
Supreme Court's 1975 decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. ,98
which replaced the admiralty rule of divided damages in collision cases with
one based upon comparative negligence, and on its 1974 decision in Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,199 which allowed contribution in
personal injury cases. One district court compared the inequities under the
1972 amendments to the "arbitrary and inequitable damage rules" done away
with by Reliable.20 0 The Third Circuit, although not expressly deciding the
availability of a credit, noted the Supreme Court's "activist attitude in
maritime matters" as one factor persuading it that a credit was a possible
solution to cases involving concurrent negligence. 20 1 Although Cooper and
Reliable cannot be considered direct authority for application of a credit,
advocates of a credit have reasoned that because the Supreme Court saw fit to
employ the concept of comparative fault in apportioning damages, this
method of fixing liability should be adapted to cases under the LHWCA as
well. 20 2
196. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Croshaw v. Koninklijke
Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (D. Or. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace
Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143, 1144 (D. Md.), rendered moot, 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975);
Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 367 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rcv'd,
528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). See also Marant v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1977). The Edmonds court felt that a credit did not produce a
harsh result from the plaintiff's point of view because he received increased benefits under the
LHWCA and would still be entitled to a limited recovery from the shipowner. 577 F.2d at 1156.
197. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Coleman &
Daly, supra note 169, at 359, 379; Shorter, supra note 169, at 678, 694.
198. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). Before 1975, damages were divided equally in collision cases in
which both parties were at fault without regard to their relative degree of fault. The Schooner
Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 169, 177 (1854).
199. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). The Cooper decision limited the rule of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), which barred contribution, to cases in which
recovery is sought from an employer covered by the LHWCA. 417 U.S. at 112-13.
200. Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (D. Or.
1975).
201. Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1977).
202. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Marant v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 145-47 (3d Cir. 1977) (dictum); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd,
B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1231-33 (D. Or. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc.,




Application of a credit in section 905(b) suits is not supported by the
legislative history and would be contrary to congressional intent. Statements
in the legislative history that shipowners are not to be charged with the
negligence of the stevedore arguably lend support to restriction of the ship-
owner's liability when considered apart from the rest of the report. A careful
reading of the entire report, however, makes it clear that Congress was
relieving shipowners of vicarious liability which had formerly been imposed
under the warranty of unseaworthiness. These statements appear as part of a
discussion comparing the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness to that
under the new cause of action for negligence and are not made in connection
with apportionment of liability. 20 3 Cases defining the extent of the ship-
owner's duty under the amendments have interpreted these statements in this
manner, refusing to hold shipowners liable unless they are at fault. 2 04 In
rejecting a credit based on this argument, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "it
is clear that the Act's intent is to absolve the shipowner from liability for
negligence on the part of the stevedore. But it is equally clear that the injured
plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of his damages."205 As to the
compromise reached in amending the LHWCA, the legislative history sug-
gests that a reduction of the plaintiff's recovery was not contemplated.
Rather, in return for the stevedore's complete insulation from liability,
shipowners were relieved of their duty to provide a seaworthy ship and were
to be held liable under a negligence standard.
20 6
In addition, there is no indication that Congress intended to abrogate the
common law rule that either of two concurrently negligent parties can be
compelled to pay the total of the plaintiff's damages.2 0 7 Contribution and
United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 367 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rets'd, 528 F.2d 675
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). See also Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409
F. Supp. 516, 523-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
203. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 10-11; Steinberg, supra note 169, at 794.
204. See, e.g., Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 569 F.2d 507, 512-13 tgth Cir.
1978); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1248-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861
(1977).
205. Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 936 (1976); accord, Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); see Darwin v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 501,
512 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. AJS, 435 F. Supp. 484, 488 n.8, 500
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 36 (W.D. Wash.
1975); Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., Monrovia, 404 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1975);
Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379 F. Supp. 759,
767, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 866 (1975).
206. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721 (2d Cir. 1978); Landon v Lief
Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 762 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). The Landon
court pointed out that the Supreme Court had justified the pre-1972 indemnity action on the
grounds that the LHWCA gave no quid pro quo to a shipowner liable for the full amount of the
longshoreman's damages, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129
(1956), but that under the 1972 amendments shipowners received a quid pro quo in the abolition
of the warranty of seaworthiness. 521 F.2d at 762.
207. E.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas. 573 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir.
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indemnification address only the adjustment of rights as between wrongdoers.
The plaintiff is not obliged to suffer a reduction in his damages because one of
the parties at fault is unavailable for contribution or to achieve equity
between wrongdoers.20 8
Moreover, longshoremen do not waive any rights they may have against the
shipowner by accepting statutory benefits from the stevedore. Longshoremen
receive no-fault benefits in return for giving up their right to sue the
stevedore. 20 9 Shipowners are strangers to the compensation system and have
given nothing which would justify reduction of their liability at the
longshoremen's expense. 210
Although the present situation is inequitable to shipowners who would be
entitled to relief but for the stevedore's immunity from suit under the
LHWCA, 211 some courts are opposed to application of a credit because it would
"impose unjustified burdens upon the injured longshoreman." 212 One judge
has pointed out that a judicial credit doctrine would vary from district to
district and would "simply shift the inequity from the shipowner to injured
longshoreman." 21 3 Shipowners are in a better position to distribute the costs
of injuries caused in part by their negligence and liability for full damages
may encourage them to take more safety precautions.
Finally, the credit proposals may also be contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.2 14 In
Halcyon, the Court refused to require contribution from a stevedore covered
by the LHWCA on the grounds that only Congress could accommodate the
diverse interests involved in the apportionment question and choose the
1978); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 671-72 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Steinberg, sulra note 169, at 794-95.
208. See 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, § 71.10, at 14-2; W. Prosser, supra note 12, § 47, at 297.
The admiralty policy of joint and several liability of tortfeasors is well-established. E.g., The
"Atlas", 93 U.S. 302, 315, 318-19 (1876); The "Alabama" & the "Game-cock", 92 U.S. 695, 697
(1875).
209. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
210. See 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, § 71.20, at 14-3.
211. Almost every court refusing to apply a credit has acknowledged the unfairness to the
shipowner. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1978); Wescott
v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Pan., 564 F.2d 875, 878 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); Santino v. Liberian
Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co.,
386 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., KG., 379
F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975). But see Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d
884, 888 (5th Cir. 1978) (shipowner is not saddled with a disproportionate burden under the
LHWCA).
212. Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); accord, Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas
Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1978).
213. Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975);
see Howard v. Romen, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1142, 1143-44 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Steinberg, supra note
169, at 797.
214. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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proper rule.215 Courts refusing to apply a credit reason that Halcyon requires
that they refrain from making any adjustment in the LHWCA and await
congressional action. 21 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated its
continuing approval of the Halcyon holding in two later cases, using it as
authority to dismiss a claim for contribution against an employer covered by
the LHWCA217 and carefully distinguishing it in Cooper.218 Although Cooper
and Reliable express the Supreme Court's approval of apportionment of
liability based upon comparative fault, apportionment is available only when
"no countervailing considerations detract" from its application. 3 9
It is unlikely that Congress intended a credit in view of its goal of
eliminating circular liability in suits under the LHWCA. Apportionment of
liability would require that stevedores be impleaded and their proportionate
fault determined by the trier of fact, 220 which would again lead to a type of
circular liability suit, resulting in delays and impeding settlements.2 21 Several
credit proposals were before Congress during the hearings on the amend-
ments. 222 Had Congress chosen to implement one of these plans, language to
that effect certainly would have been included in the statute and outlined in
the legislative history. 223
C. Reduction or Elimination of the Stevedore's
Right to Reimbursement
1. The Nature of the Stevedore's Lien
Courts confronted with the question of a credit also must determine
whether the stevedore's negligence should either reduce or eliminate his lien
215. Id. at 286-87.
216. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725-26 (2d Cir. 1978); Samuels v.
Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1978); Shellman v. United
States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge
v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1975), cetd. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976); Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 tW.D. Wash.
1975); Solsvik v. MAaremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1975)
217. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 406 U.S. 340 (1972) (per curiam).
218. 417 U.S. at 111-13.
219. Id. at 113.
220. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 78-479); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 279 Or. 477, 510, 569 P.2d 1040, 1057-58 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978); Cohen
& Dougherty, supra note 169, at 597-98.
221. See Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., K.G., 379 F
Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Steinberg, supra note 169, at 796-97. Several courts have held that it
is neither necessary nor appropriate for the stevedore to be made a party in a § 905(b) suit. See,
e.g., Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 761 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976); Darwin v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 501, 512 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gallardo v
Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 488 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (findings of fact regarding
the stevedores conduct "have no independent legal significance"). But see Marant v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (application of a credit may reduce litigation and
promote settlement by removing the plaintiff's incentive to recover a large judgement).
222. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 136, 154 (proration of damages according to degree of
fault and pro tanto contribution).
223. See Steinberg, supra note 169, at 786-87.
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upon the longshoreman's recovery. The stevedore's right to reimbursement
was not an issue in third-party suits until 1.938. The LHWCA as originally
enacted provided that acceptance of compensation benefits by an injured
longshoreman resulted in the automatic assignment of his claim against the
third party to his employer. 224 In 1938, section 933(b) was amended to
provide for such an assignment only when the compensation was paid under a
formal award. 225 The LHWCA, however, continued to direct that benefits be
paid voluntarily and that formal awards be made only when the
stevedore contested his liability for compensation benefits. 226 Thus, long-
shoremen were receiving both statutory benefits and the proceeds from
third-party suits against shipowners, except in the few cases in which benefits
were paid under a formal award.
In 1943, this double recovery was eliminated. In The Etna,2 the Third
Circuit, relying on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, held that the
LHWCA did not entitle longshoremen to both compensation and damages for
the same injury. Accordingly, the court ruled that the stevedore must be
reimbursed out of any third-party recovery regardless of whether compensa-
tion had been paid under a formal award A2 8 The court reasoned that the
224. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 33(b), 44 Stat. 1440
(1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976)). In addition, § 933 provided that in a suit
brought by an employer after an assignment, the employee should be given any amount
remaining after the employer had been reimbursed for expenses in bringing the suit and benefits
paid. Id. § 33(e) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) ('976)). The employer has always had the
option of settling the claim following an assignment. Id. § 33(d) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 933(d)
(1976)).
225. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, ch. 685, § 12(b), 52 Stat. 1168 (1938) (current
version at 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976)). The section was amended to give longshoremen an
opportunity to sue the shipowner because employers pursued the longshoremen's claims only to
the extent neccessary to recover the compensation benefits they had paid. See Louviere v. Shell
Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1975). See also American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330
U.S. 446, 456 (1947).
Section 933 was amended again in 1959. In a further attempt to encourage stevedores to
prosecute adequately the assigned cause of action, Congress revised subsection (e) to permit the
employer, as an assignee of the longshoreman's claim, to retain one-fifth of the amount
recovered beyond expenses and benefits paid. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, Pub. L. 86-171, § 33(e), 73 Stat. 391 (1959) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 933(c) (1976)).
Congress also amended subsection (b) to provide that acceptance of compensation under an
award would result in an assignment only if the longshoreman failed to bring an action within six
months. Id. § 33(e) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976)); see S. Rep. No. 428, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [19591 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2134, 2135. These
provisions were virtually unchanged by the 1972 amendments.
226. 33 U.S.C. § 914(a) (1976). This section, unchanged by the amendments, provides that
"[c]ompensation .. .shall be paid periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled
thereto, without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the
employer." Id.
227. 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
228. Id. at 40; accord, Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
aff'd sub nor. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886
(1953). The Senate Report accompanying the 1959 amendments to § 933 suggests that Congress
recognized and approved the use of judicially created liens. The Report states that "[aplthough an
employee could receive compensation under the act and f:)r the same injury recover damages in a
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statute, by permitting the stevedore reimbursement only when he paid
benefits under a formal award, encouraged him to controvert his liability for
the benefits. 229 Therefore, after The Etna the stevedore was assured of
reimbursement: if he paid the benefits voluntarily he was given a lien on the
recovery; if he paid the benefits under a formal award he was given an
assignment.
In 1953, the Supreme Court held that even when the stevedore's negligence
contributed to the injury, he may still enforce a lien on the recovery. In Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,230 a shipowner argued that repayment of benefits
would constitute an unconscionable reward if the stevedore were also negli-
gent. Instead, he proposed that the lien be denied and the recovery against the
shipowner be reduced by an equal amount.2 3 The Court rejected this proposal,
reasoning that the LHWCA expressly provided for reimbursement, that it
would frustrate the LHWCA's purpose of protecting stevedores who are
subject to absolute liability for statutory benefits, and that it would be "the
substantial equivalent of contribution. 2 32
third-party suit, he would not be entitled to double compensation. The bill, as amended, provides
that an employer must be reimbursed for any compensation paid to the employee out of the net
proceeds of the recovery." S. Rep. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [19591 Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2134, 2135. Nothing in the 1972 amendments appears to have undermined
the validity of The Etna. See, e.g., Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1975);
Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 282-83 (Sth Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078(1976);
Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei G.m. B.H., S.S. Etha, 417 F. Supp. 176, 177-78 (E.DN.Y.
1976), aft'd, 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit, however, appears to have adopted
a broader definition of award which would mean more claims would be assigned to the stevedore.
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1977), the court held that
"some act of ratification of compensation, whether formal or informal, and the subsequent
acceptance of compensation by the claimant" is sufficient to bring the case within § 933(b) and
therefore may result in an assignment. Id. at 1102.
Much of the litigation concerning the stevedore's lien occurs in disputes between the stevedore
and the plaintiff's attorney concerning who has priority over the proceeds of the third-party
recovery. Pre-1972 cases generally held that the stevedore's lien had full priority over the
attorney's when the recovery was insufficient to satisfy both. See, e.g., Davis v. United States
Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 1958); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461,
464 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd sub non. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953). Under the 1972 amendments, the majority rule appears to require
the stevedore to share in the cost of the attorney by receiving less than full reimbursement
because the stevedore has received a benefit and his interests are now allied with tho.,e of the
longshoreman, see, e.g., Swift v. Bolten, 517 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1975); Chouest v. A & P Boat
Rentals, Inc., 472 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973), or to permit the
attorney's fee to be recovered first. See Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei, G.M.B.H., S.S. Etha,
552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977); Bloomer v. Tung, 448 F. Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see
Cella v. Partenreederei Ms Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1975) (stevedore's lien has full
priority because the primary goal of the 1972 amendments is to protect his resources for payment
of increased benefits), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976). See generally, Gorman, stupra note 1, at
24-26.
229. 138 F.2d at 40.
230. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
231. Id. at 411-12.
232. Id. at 412. Although the Court based its refusal to reduce the stevedore's lien upon
§ 933, under the facts of the case compensation had been paid without an award and thus it did not
come within the section. See Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D.
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2. Freedom of the Courts To Diminish
the Stevedore's Lien
There is little evidence of legislative intent with respect to the stevedore's
right of reimbursement under the 1972 amendments. It is not mentioned in
the committee report and section 933 was left virtually unchanged. Supporters
of the credit have argued that section 905(b) is not a bar to reduction of the
lien because it refers to legal rather than equitable rights, and was intended to
eliminate only indemnity actions. 233 They contend that since the lien is
equitable in origin and nature, it should be subject to equitable regulation by
the courts. 234 The argument advanced in favor of reduction of the lien is that
the stevedore should not profit from his negligent conduct. Proponents of a
credit point out that if the stevedore is allowed to enforce his lien on the
recovery, he is in a better position when there is concurrent fault than he
would be if no one were negligent since, in the latter situation, he would have
no right of reimbursement. 235 Reduction of the lien has also been defended on
the theory that despite the lack of legislative guidance on this issue, it would
be contrary to congressional intent "to protect the stevedore's equitable lien
from his own negligent conduct. '236 Finally, supporters of the credit point out
that reduction or elimination of the lien is not inequitable because, under any
of the credit proposals, the stevedore's liability does not exceed what it would
have been had no third party been involved or had the plaintiff failed to
recover. 237
Under the better view, courts refusing to apply a credit have recognized that
any proposal which requires reduction of the stevedore's lien would amount to
a form of indirect liability which is prohibited by section 905(b).2 38 If the
stevedore has an unconditional right to reimbursement, diminishing it in
connection with a reduction of the shipowner's damages achieves the same
result as contribution. The stevedore, because of his negligence, is deprived of
funds to which he would otherwise be entitled and the shipowner's liability is
Cal. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d
875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
233. See, e.g., Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, 3.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1233
(D. Or. 1975); Coleman, supra note 169, at 689.
234. See, e.g., Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1233-34
(D. Or. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143, 1144 (D. Md.),
rendered moot, 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975); 1A Benedict, supra note 27, § 119, at 6-33.
235. See Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 410; Shorter, supra note 169, at 679. An
unconditional right to reimbursement has also been criticized as encouraging unsafe working
conditions. See Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 408 n.274, 409; Shorter, supra note 169, at
681.
236. Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (D. Or.
1975).
237. See Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Cohen
& Dougherty, supra note 169, at 606-07; Coleman & Daly, supra note 169, at 399; Shorter, supra
note 169, at 671, 681, 694.
238. See, e.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritima.s Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.
1978); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d. 675, 678-79 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 673
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 279 Or. 477,
509, 569 P.2d 1040, 1057 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
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commensurately reduced. 239 Under section 905(b), a shipowner and a steve-
dore would be barred from making an express agreement providing that in
the event of an injury to a longshoreman the stevedore would partially
reimburse the shipowner for any judgment against him. 24 0 A court would be
unjustified in imposing such a result by different means.
In addition, reduction of the lien will discourage stevedores from paying
compensation benefits voluntarily, a result totally inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the LHWCA. Section 933(b) specifically provides for an assignment
when compensation has been paid under a formal award. Unless this section
is either amended or eliminated, a credit doctrine could be applied only in
cases where no formal award was made. Stevedores would then controvert
their liability for benefits in order to bring any subsequent suit within section
933(b) and thereby assure themselves of reimbursement. 24'
A second argument in support of eliminating the stevedore's lien is that the
lien has been replaced by a direct action against the shipowner in which the
stevedore's negligence can be asserted as a defense. This theory is based upon
the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v.
Burnside Shipping Co. 242 In Burnside, the Court allowed a suit against a
shipowner in a case in which the benefits payable under the LHWCA, and
thus the stevedore's lien, exceeded the potential third-party recovery. 243
Supporters of a credit argue that Burnside has overruled Pope & Talbot in
that a suit against the shipowner is now the only means available to the
stevedore to recoup the compensation benefits he has paid. 2 4 4
Burnside, however, did not eliminate the stevedore's lien, but merely held
that the lien was not the stevedore's sole remedy.2 45 Courts overwhelmingly
have held that Pope & Talbot is controlling in cases under the 1972 amend-
ments, precluding a defense of negligence to the stevedore's right of reim-
bursement. 246 Nothing in the amendments or the legislative history under-
239. See Steinberg, supra note 169, at 792-93.
240. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
241. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th Cir 1977);
The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1943).
242. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
243. In Burnside, the potential liability of the stevedore for compensation payments to a
longshoreman's widow was $70,000, but the maximum recovery under the applicable wrongful
death statute was $30,000. Id. at 410. The Supreme Court held that the employer's rights
are not limited to the assignment provided for in § 933(b) of the LHWCA. Id. at 412-14. In
addition, the stevedore was permitted to sue the shipowner for negligence rendering the stevedore
liable for compensation payments. Id. at 414-17. This direct action against the shipowner was
distinguished from contribution because it was not based upon any theory of joint responsibility
for the longshoreman's injury but upon a breach of an independent duty of reasonable care owed
to the stevedore. Id. at 417-18.
244. Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362, 369-70 (C.D. Ca.
1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). See Coleman &
Daly, supra note 169, at 399. This was the shipowner's argument in Landon v. Lief Hoegh &
Co., 521 F.2d 756, 758-60 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
245. 394 U.S. at 412.
246. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725 (2d Cir. 1978) (dictum); Sheilman v.
United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 678-79 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976); Dodge v. litsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
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mines its continuing validity. In addition, the Burnside action has been
limited to situations in which the longshoreman's recovery would be in-
sufficient to reimburse the stevedore. 24 7
D. A Callfor Judicial Restraint
Read broadly, the Supreme Court's decision in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.248 prohibits not only contribution, but also
any judicial interference in a statutory scheme set up by Congress. 2 4 9 The
Third Circuit has pointed out "that the apportionment question is fraught
with difficulty, that it involves largely intractable conflicting interests, and
that it implicates in contradictory ways three ordinarily separate fields of law,
to-wit, the common law of torts, statutory workmen's compensation law, and
the law maritime. '2 -0 Any judicial solution to the problems raised by the third-
party suit ultimately involves a determination of which party can best bear
the burden and which body of law should prevail .2 S
Giving rights to one party necessarily takes rights away from another. The
injured employee argues that he has a right to full common law damages from
a negligent third party who is a stranger to the compensation system. The
stevedore asserts that he should be immune from suits stemming from his
obligation to make no-fault compensation payments and a right to reim-
bursement when the negligence of a third party renders him liable for those
payments. And the shipowner contends that he should be liable only to the
extent of his own fault in causing the injury as he would be but for the fact
that the concurrently negligent party is the plaintiff's employer.2 5 2
Resolution of this dilemma should be left. to Congress. 253 Congress has
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34,
36 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
247. Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 76D (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1053 (1976). The Landon court raised the possibility that a Burnside action would contravene
§ 905(b). Id. at 761 & n.6. But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.
1977) (opinion allowing a negligence suit by an insurance company against a shipowner to recover
the amount by which its lien exceeded the proceeds of a settlement).
248. 342 U.S. 282 (1952), discussed at notes 214-19 supra and accompanying text.
249. In distinguishing Halcyon, the Supreme Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) stated that contribution was prohibited in Halcyon because It
would have been "inconsistent with the balance struck by Congress in the [LHWCA] between tie
interests of carriers, employers, employees, and their respective insurers." Id. at 112. The Court
added that the considerations relied on by the Halcyon court "still have much force. Indeed, tie
1972 amendments to the [LHWCA] reemphasize Congress' determination that as between an
employer and its injured employee, the right to compensation under the Act should be the
employee's exclusive remedy." Id. at 112-13.
250. Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1977).
251. See Steinberg, supra note 169, at 797.
252. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., - Min. -, -, 257 N.W.2d 679, 685 (1977)
(considering the question of apportionment under Minneso-a law); 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, §
761 at 14-287, 14-406.
253. See Steinberg, supra note 169, at 799-80. See also 2A A. Larson, supra note 12, § 76.53,
at 14-407.
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considered the rights of all three parties in studying the state of affairs that
existed before the 1972 amendments. Its decision to restrict the shipowner's
obligation to pay damages to cases in which he is negligent, but then to
impose full liability, should not be disturbed.
Anne Hinterneister
